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#GUILTY? SUBLET v. STATE AND THE AUTHENTICATION OF
SOCIAL MEDIA EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
ELIZABETH A. FLANAGAN*
“[W]ith social networks and other tools on the Internet, all of these 500
million people have a way to say what they’re thinking
and have their voice be heard.”1
I. THE COURTROOM MEETS THE CHAT ROOM: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA IN LITIGATION
The above quotation, from Facebook founder and CEO, Mark Zuck-
erberg, reflects the dynamic nature of social media in today’s society: over
half a billion people worldwide can express themselves to a potentially
unlimited audience through social media networks.2  This quote also dem-
onstrates an undisputed fact: social media is everywhere.3  In fact, the Pew
Internet Project calculated that, as of January 2014, 74% of online adults
have used a social networking site.4  An estimated 71% of online American
adults use Facebook, making it the most popular social media site in the
* J.D. Candidate, 2017, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law;
M.S.W. 2014, University of Pennsylvania; B.A. 2010, University of Pennsylvania.
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entire process.
1. Ki Mae Heussner, Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg Talks to Diane Sawyer as Web-
site Gets 500-Millionth Member, ABC NEWS (July 21, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/
WN/zuckerberg-calls-movie-fiction-disputes-signing-contract-giving/
story?id=11217015 [https://perma.cc/23UX-L2BQ] (quoting Mark Zuckerberg
and discussing social media’s broad reach) (internal quotation marks omitted).
2. See id. (identifying number of Facebook users worldwide); see also Andrew
B. Delaney & Darren A. Heitner, Made for Each Other Social Media and Litigation,
N.Y. ST. B.J., Feb. 2013, at 10, 11–12 (providing social media statistics as of time of
publication).  Delaney and Heitner state that the most popular social networking
site, Facebook, has over one billion users, half of whom will log in on any given
day. See id. at 11 (discussing users’ Facebook activity worldwide).
3. See Delaney & Heitner, supra note 2, at 11 (explaining prevalence of social
media in society).  Delaney and Heitner note that almost half of Americans use
some sort of social media, and these numbers are quickly rising. See id. (describing
popularity of social media among Americans).
4. See Social Networking Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR., www.pewinternet.org/fact-
sheets/social-networking-fact-sheet [https://perma.cc/8NTM-YANK] (last up-
dated Sept. 2014) (providing statistics regarding social media usage worldwide).
The Pew Research Center “conducts public opinion polling, demographic re-
search, media content analysis, and other empirical social science research.” See id.
(describing purpose).
(287)
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United States.5  Additionally, over 23% of online adults in the United
States use at least one of the other three most popular social media sites:
Twitter, LinkedIn, and Instagram.6  With the ever-increasing ease of access
to social media, users are able to instantly share personal information with
a potentially limitless audience at the tap of a button.7
As social media has become more ubiquitous, its use in litigation has
become a topic of great debate.8  One particular issue in this debate is
how social media evidence can be authenticated.9  Courts in multiple juris-
5. See id. (discussing Facebook usage and popularity in United States); see also
Zoe Rosenthal, Note, “Sharing” with the Court: The Discoverability of Private Social Me-
dia Accounts in Civil Litigation, 25 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 227,
229 (2014) (commenting on rapid growth in Facebook usage since creation in
2004).  Rosenthal notes that, as of the time of her writing, Facebook comprised
one in every five Internet page views in the United States. See id.
6. See Social Networking Fact Sheet, supra note 4 (discussing Americans’ usage of
various social networking sites).  According to this study, 23% of online adults in
the United States use Twitter, 26% use Instagram, and 28% use LinkedIn. See id.
7. See Breanne M. Democko, Comment, Social Media and the Rules on Authenti-
cation, 43 U. TOL. L. REV. 367, 376 (2012) (noting social networking sites, specifi-
cally Facebook, have added “functions and applications [ ] allow[ing] users to
communicate in” variety of different ways).  Democko notes here that social media
surpassed e-mail in 2009 as the preferred form of electronic communication world-
wide. See id. at 367 (illustrating popularity of social media as new way of communi-
cating with others).  Further, social media users access their accounts not only
through their computers but also through their cell phones, creating an unprece-
dented ease of access to social media accounts. See id. (describing ways in which
many individuals access their social media accounts).
8. See generally Delaney & Heitner, supra note 2 (relating social media to ex-
isting rules of evidence); Democko, supra note 7 (discussing developments in so-
cial media and its use in litigation).  Courts have “consistently rejected” litigants’
arguments that social media content is protected under a “user’s right to privacy”
because the user is sharing the content with others, even if they are only part of a
select group of “friends.” See Margaret DiBianca, Managing Clients’ Social-Media Evi-
dence, DEL. LAW., Fall 2014, at 26, 27 (describing current debate regarding social
media content and privacy).
9. See Democko, supra note 7, at 388–89 (discussing courts’ varying responses
to social media evidence).  Democko notes that, when courts “face[ ] issues of au-
thentication, some courts appear uncomfortable and highly skeptical” because of
the ease with which social media could be tampered with, while other courts read-
ily equate “social networking sites to other forms of Internet-based communica-
tions[,]” which allows these courts to rely on more established precedent in their
decisions. See id. (describing legal ambiguity courts face when addressing authenti-
cation of social media); see also, e.g., Parker v. State, 85 A.3d 682, 683 (Del. 2014)
(discussing standard of authentication required for social media evidence);
Fawcett v. Altieri, 960 N.Y.S.2d 592, 595 (Sup. Ct. 2013) (describing two-prong
analysis required to compel discovery of social media accounts).
In Parker, the Delaware Supreme Court held that authentication of social me-
dia evidence could be accomplished if the proponent presented sufficient evi-
dence that a reasonable juror could find that the post was what the proponent
claimed it to be. See Parker, 85 A.3d at 687–88 (detailing standard for trial judge to
apply when litigant “seeks to introduce social media evidence” and has offered
evidence to authenticate it).
In Fawcett, a New York Supreme Court described a two-pronged analysis for
determining whether a social media post was discoverable: first, whether the con-
2
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dictions have recently begun to address the evidentiary requirements for
social media, seeking to craft a workable standard for authentication.10
In Sublet v. State,11 the Maryland Court of Appeals decided three con-
solidated cases addressing the authentication of messages and posts made
via Facebook and Twitter and developed a vague outline of the ways in
which a party can authenticate social media evidence.12  The court relied
on Maryland Rule 5-901, which is based on Rule 901(a) of the Federal
Rules of Evidence.13  Under the federal rule, in order to authenticate an
tent was “material and necessary” to the litigation and second, whether compelling
production would violate the privacy rights of the account holder. See Fawcett, 960
N.Y.S.2d at 595 (internal quotation marks omitted) (describing test after “sur-
vey[ing] [ ] cases dealing with the production of social media accounts[ ] in both
the criminal and civil contexts”).  For a detailed discussion of Fawcett and Parker,
see infra notes 28 and 49, respectively.
10. See, e.g., State v. Eleck, 23 A.3d 818, 822 (Conn. App. Ct.) (describing
methods for social media authentication), cert. granted mem. in part by 30 A.3d 2
(Conn. 2011), and aff’d on other grounds by 100 A.3d 817 (Conn. 2014); Parker, 85
A.2d at 683 (discussing various approaches to social media authentication); Griffin
v. State, 19 A.3d 415, 424 (Md. 2011) (suggesting greater scrutiny may be required
for social media authentication “because of the heightened possibility for manipu-
lation by other than the true user or poster”).  For further discussion of Griffin,
Eleck, and Parker, see infra notes 33–38 and accompanying text, note 60, and note
49, respectively.
Because of concerns that social media evidence could have been tampered
with by another party and because of courts’ general unfamiliarity with social me-
dia, “some courts [ ] apply an extraneously high standard of authentication,”
which may lead to the inevitable exclusion of crucial evidence. See Democko, supra
note 7, at 369 (“Since social media has become the preferred method of communi-
cation, applying such a high standard to authenticate electronic evidence would
inevitably exclude a mass quantity of crucial evidence.”).  For a further discussion,
see Josh Gilliland, The Admissibility of Social Media Evidence, ABA, http://apps.ameri
canbar.org/litigation/litigationnews/trial_skills/030413-tips-admissibility-ESI.html
[https://perma.cc/8FJ4-KRSG] (last visited Mar. 28, 2016) (“The Rules of Evi-
dence do not update like an app whenever a new smartphone or electronic device
is released.  For that reason, courts apply the evidence rules similarly to all evi-
dence, including social media.”); Steven Goode, The Admissibility of Electronic Evi-
dence, 29 REV. LITIG. 1 (2009) (discussing application of authentication rules to
social media evidence); Elana Harris, Authenticating Social Media Evidence (Part II of
V): Federal Rules of Evidence 901(b)(1), PAGEVAULT (Sept. 14, 2015), https://www
.page-vault.com/authenticate-webpage-2/ [https://perma.cc/YW2M-WE6B] (sug-
gesting three questions to consider in attempting to authenticate social media evi-
dence: “1. When, where and how was the evidence collected? . . . 2. Who collected
the evidence? . . . 3. How was the evidence preserved?”); David I. Schoen, The
Authentication of Social Media Postings, ABA (May 17, 2011), https://apps.american
bar.org/litigation/committees/trialevidence/articles/051711-authentication-so-
cial-media.html [https://perma.cc/V25B-LSG3] (discussing evidentiary implica-
tions of increased prevalence of social media in litigation).
11. 113 A.3d 695 (Md. 2015).
12. See id. at 698 (utilizing reasonable juror standard for authentication of
social media evidence). See infra notes 70–105 and accompanying text for facts
and reasoning of Sublet.
13. See id. at 697–98 (discussing relevant Maryland rule and application to
case at issue). MARYLAND RULE 5-901(a) reads, “The requirement of authentica-
tion or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evi-
3
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item of evidence, “the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to sup-
port a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.”14  In each
of the three cases decided by the Sublet court, the court relied on a variety
of circumstantial evidence in authenticating the social media evidence at
issue.15
This Note discusses the vague standard outlined in Sublet and points
to a need for further clarification of authentication standards for social
media posts.16  Part II provides background information regarding the use
of social media in litigation.17  Part III discusses the facts and holding of
Sublet.18  Part IV analyzes the Sublet majority’s decision-making process as
well as the dissent’s critique of it.19  Part V provides a critical analysis of
the court’s reasoning in Sublet.20  Finally, Part VI highlights the impact of
Sublet and recommends a clearer standard for authentication that effec-
tively balances the value of social media evidence against the myriad con-
cerns regarding authorship.21
II. EVIDENCE GOES VIRAL: SOCIAL MEDIA’S EXPANDED USE
IN LITIGATION BEFORE SUBLET
In 2009, social media surpassed e-mail as the preferred use of online
communication worldwide.22  As of 2013, an estimated 500,000 people
logged into Facebook, the most popular social media site, every day.23
With social media’s increased prevalence, litigants increasingly attempt to
dence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its
proponent claims.” MD. R. 5-901(a).
14. See FED. R. EVID. 901(a) (providing general federal rule of evidence re-
garding authentication).
15. See generally Sublet, 113 A.3d 695 (using circumstantial evidence in each
case to determine authenticity of social media evidence).  For further discussion of
the standards used in Sublet, see infra notes 106–21 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 111–18 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Sublet
court’s standard. See infra notes 119–25 for a discussion of problems with the
court’s current standard.
17. For a complete discussion of cases and research relating to the issue ad-
dressed in Sublet, see infra notes 22–69 and accompanying text.
18. For a complete discussion of the facts of the three consolidated cases con-
sidered in Sublet, see infra notes 70–105 and accompanying text.
19. For analysis of the Sublet court’s reasoning, see infra notes 106–21 and
accompanying text.
20. For a critical analysis of the issues surrounding social media authentica-
tion, see infra notes 122–37 and accompanying text.
21. For discussion of the impact of Sublet on future litigation, see infra notes
138–48 and accompanying text.
22. See Democko, supra note 7, at 367 (noting worldwide prevalence of social
networking and blogging websites).
23. See Delaney & Heitner, supra note 2, at 11 (discussing rapid growth of
social media use).  Delaney and Heitner note that almost half of the United States’
population used social media in 2013. See id.  At the time the article was written,
“Facebook report[ed] that it ha[d] more than one billion users who log[ged] in at
least once per month, half of whom will log in to Facebook any given day.” Id.
(footnote omitted).  The authors also discuss LinkedIn and Twitter, noting that
4
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introduce information from these accounts as evidence in both civil and
criminal trials.24  The growing use of social media in litigation has created
a broad debate among courts over how best to address issues of discovera-
bility, admissibility, and authentication standards for social media
evidence.25
A. Keeping Your Selfies to Yourself: The Debate over Privacy
Settings and Discoverability
Courts consistently allow discovery of social media evidence, even
those posts the account holder assumes are protected by privacy settings.26
Moreover, they regularly hold that discoverability of social media evidence
these sites, like Facebook, have reported rapid growth in membership since their
creation. See id. at 11–12.
24. See Delaney & Heitner, supra note 2, at 14–15 (discussing benefits and
issues social media creates for litigation process); Jonathan D. Frieden & Leigh M.
Murray, The Admissibility of Electronic Evidence Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 17
RICH. J.L. & TECH. 5, *1 (discussing importance of proper authentication of social
media).  Delaney and Heitner note that much of the information that can easily be
gathered from social media accounts would have only been available through the
use of a private investigator in years past. See Delaney & Heitner, supra note 2, at
11 (identifying how social media has changed landscape of litigation process).  Ad-
vances in technology and social media have led to an evolution in the available
forms of communication, creating unique challenges for both litigants and judges.
See Democko, supra note 7, at 368 (“Technology continues to rapidly evolve into
increasingly complex portals of communication, and courts are left to interpret
the evidentiary questions resulting from each advance.”).
25. See also Parker v. State, 85 A.3d 682, 683 (Del. 2014) (presenting varying
approaches to social media authentication). Compare Griffin v. State, 19 A.3d 415,
427 (Md. 2011) (suggesting higher standard of authentication required for social
media than other evidence because of high potential for fabrication), with Tienda
v. State, 358 S.W.3d 633, 647 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (requiring “sufficient circum-
stantial evidence to support a finding that the exhibits were what they purported to
be”).  Some courts disagree as to whether new rules should be adopted for discov-
erability, admissibility, and authentication. See, e.g., id.; see also Democko, supra
note 7, at 369–71 (acknowledging advocates’ desires to amend Federal Rules of
Evidence to specifically address electronic evidence; however rebutting such
change because “social networking sites pose the same concerns as and are funda-
mentally similar to other forms of Internet-based communications, which most
courts have authenticated using the same standard and mechanisms as traditional
forms of evidence”).
26. See DiBianca, supra note 8, at 27 (asserting parties in litigation are entitled
to discovery of social media content, regardless of privacy settings imposed by
user).  Litigants argue that they should have “privacy protections” over their social
media content because, taking Facebook as an example, they only allow certain
people, i.e., “friends,” the ability to view their social media accounts and messages.
See id.  (internal quotation marks omitted).  Courts regularly reject this argument,
finding that, because the user has shared his or her profile with at least one other
person, it is inherently no longer private and therefore is subject to discovery. See
id. (“[C]ourts find that ‘private’ is not necessarily the same as ‘not public.’ By shar-
ing content with others, even in limited numbers, the user has lost his or her right
to keep such information ‘private.’”).  For a discussion of the privacy aspect, see
generally Allyson Haynes Stuart, Finding Privacy in a Sea of Social Media and Other E-
Discovery, 12 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 149 (2014).
5
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should be governed by the standard evidentiary rules regarding discov-
ery.27  Consequently, courts apply a two-pronged analysis to determine
whether evidence may be discovered from a particular social media ac-
count.  The party seeking to admit the evidence must demonstrate first
that the content is material and necessary to its case, and then show that
any violation of the account holder’s right to privacy is outweighed by the
probative value of the content.28
B. Admissibility of Social Media Is Trending in Litigation
After satisfying the two-pronged test necessary for discovery, the party
seeking to admit social media evidence must then properly authenticate
evidence from that account in order to make it admissible in court.29  Be-
27. See Steven S. Gensler, Special Rules for Social Media Discovery?, 65 ARK. L.
REV. 7, 16–17 (2012) (discussing court’s use of standard discovery rules to order
plaintiffs to produce social media messages in EEOC v. Simply Storage Mgmt. LLC,
270 F.R.D. 430 (S.D. Ind. 2010)).  The court in Simply Storage noted that “remarka-
bly few published decisions provide guidance on the issues presented here.” See
Simply Storage, 270 F.R.D. at 434 (finding social media discovery likely to be fre-
quent issue in litigation and noting, “[d]iscovery of [social networking sites] re-
quires the application of basic discovery principles in a novel context”).
Commentators have generally agreed with the use of current federal and state dis-
covery rules to deal with social media evidence. See, e.g., Gensler, supra, at 10 (“Not
only do I think social-media discovery fits easily into the existing discovery scheme,
I think judges have, for the most part, already figured out how to fit it in.”); Rosen-
thal, supra note 5, at 261 (arguing need to apply standard evidentiary rules to social
media discovery).
28. See Fawcett v. Altieri, 960 N.Y.S.2d 592, 595 (Sup. Ct. 2013) (discussing
two-pronged analysis regarding discoverability of social media evidence).
In Fawcett, two personal injury defendants requested discovery of the plaintiff’s
social media accounts, including accounts on Facebook, MySpace, Friendster,
Flickr, and other websites; the plaintiffs objected to the discovery of such informa-
tion, arguing that the accounts were both private and irrelevant to the litigation at
issue. See id. at 594–95 (describing discovery request and response).  The court
agreed with the plaintiffs, finding that the defendants’ request for discovery was a
fishing expedition and that they intended to undertake it in the hopes that some-
thing relevant would be discovered. Id. at 597. (“There must be a clear factual
predicate in order to compel the production of social media records from the
defendants or authorizations for the production of that material from certain so-
cial media providers.”).  The court held that this was not a sufficient basis to com-
pel discovery of social media posts and denied the defendants’ request. See id.
(“The party requesting the discovery of an adversary’s restricted social media ac-
counts should first demonstrate a good faith basis to make the request.”).
29. See Delaney & Heitner, supra note 2, at 14 (discussing authentication pro-
cess of social media evidence after such evidence has been discovered).  While no
rules specifically address social media authentication, courts have typically applied
FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 901(a) to social media evidence. See id. (explaining e-
discovery processing firm’s report on how courts have relied on FEDERAL RULE OF
EVIDENCE 901(a) to determine whether social media evidence was properly authen-
ticated).  Besides using Rule 901(a), courts have also relied on FEDERAL RULE OF
EVIDENCE 901(b)(4), which states that electronically stored information can be au-
thenticated with circumstantial evidence that reflects the “contents, substance, in-
ternal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics” of the evidence. See id.
(describing how “[a] party can authenticate electronically stored information”).
6
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cause of the unique nature of social media, no bright-line rule currently
exists for authentication.30
1. Which Standard to Sign up for?: The Maryland and Texas Approaches
Since 2011, several courts have dealt with the issue of social media
authentication differently; however, two particular standards have
emerged as the most prominent: the Maryland Approach and the Texas
Approach.31
In 2011, the Maryland Court of Appeals laid out what some commen-
tators and courts have classified as a “high standard” for authenticating
social media evidence in Griffin v. State.32  In Griffin, the prosecution
“sought to introduce [the defendant’s] girlfriend’s . . . MySpace profile to
demonstrate that, prior to trial, [the girlfriend] had allegedly threatened
another witness called by the State.”33  The prosecution presented “a MyS-
pace profile in the name of ‘Sistasouljah,’” which not only contained the
alleged threat, but also identifying information such as the profile owner’s
birthday, location, and a picture of the defendant and his girlfriend to-
gether.34  The State attempted to authenticate the MySpace profile and
messages as the girlfriend’s using the lead investigator from the case.35
The appellate court ruled these efforts insufficient, emphasizing the
ease with which an individual can both make a MySpace profile in another
30. See id. at 14 (noting lack of “hard and fast rules” for authenticating social
media evidence); see also Paul W. Grimm, Lisa Yurwit Bergstrom & Melissa M.
O’Toole–Loureiro, Authentication of Social Media Evidence, 36 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC.
433, 441 (2013) (“At present, the cases that address the authentication and admis-
sibility evidence of social media evidence . . . unfortunately arrive at widely dispa-
rate outcomes.”).
31. See Griffin v. State, 19 A.3d 415, 427–28 (Md. 2011) (articulating “Mary-
land” standard for authentication); Tienda v. State, 358 S.W.3d 633, 647 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2012) (setting out “Texas” standard for authentication); see also, e.g.,
State v. Eleck, 23 A.3d 818, 822 (Conn. App. Ct.) (describing standard similar to
Griffin court’s for social media authentication), cert. granted mem. in part by 30 A.3d
2 (Conn. 2011), and aff’d on other grounds by 100 A.3d 817 (Conn. 2014); Parker v.
State, 85 A.3d 682, 686–88 (Del. 2014) (separating past cases into “Maryland ap-
proach” and “Texas approach”). See infra notes 35–38 and accompanying text for
details regarding the Maryland standard for authentication and notes 39–42 and
accompanying text for details regarding the Texas standard for authentication.
32. 19 A.3d 415 (Md. 2011); see also Parker, 85 A.3d at 686 (describing Mary-
land Approach as “[t]he higher standard for social media authentication”);
Grimm et al., supra note 30, at 441 (describing Maryland Approach as setting “an
unnecessarily high bar for the admissibility of social media evidence by not admit-
ting the exhibit unless the court definitively determines that the evidence is au-
thentic”). But see Wendy Angus-Anderson, Brief, Authenticity and Admissibility of
Social Media Website Printouts, 14 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 33, 44–46 (2015) (arguing
Maryland and Texas Approaches can be reconciled).
33. See Griffin, 19 A.3d at 418 (explaining case background).
34. See id. (providing factual background of social media evidence sought to
be admitted into court).
35. See id. at 418–19 (explaining Maryland’s authentication method and pro-
viding investigator’s testimony at trial).
7
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person’s name as well as access another party’s MySpace profile.36  The
court noted as an initial matter that authentication requires that the pro-
ponent produce evidence sufficient to demonstrate that the item is what
the proponent claims it to be.37  Although the court proffered a non-ex-
haustive list of other ways the prosecution could have authenticated the
social media evidence, its analysis suggests a belief that social media evi-
dence should be held to a higher standard of authentication than other
evidence.38
The following year, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals took a less
restrictive approach to authenticating social media evidence in Tienda v.
State.39  In Tienda, the prosecution introduced evidence from three MyS-
pace profile pages allegedly belonging to the defendant, who was con-
victed of murder in a gang-related shootout.40  Defense counsel argued
that, because of the ease with which a person could create a MySpace pro-
file in someone else’s name, as well as the fact that any reference to case-
specific facts were not facts solely within the defendant’s knowledge, the
evidence should not have been admitted.41  The court found that courts
“need not be persuaded that the proffered evidence is authentic”; instead,
the court only needs “to decide . . . whether the proponent of the evi-
dence has supplied facts that are sufficient to support a reasonable jury
determination that the evidence he has proffered is authentic.”42
Thus, even if there is “the possibility that someone other than the
alleged creator of the evidence created or manipulated” the proffered so-
cial media evidence, as long as there is “sufficient evidence of authenticity”
such that “a reasonable jury [could] conclude that the evidence was au-
36. See id. at 423–24 (describing court’s reasoning and deciding girlfriend’s
personal information were not “sufficient distinctive characteristics . . . to authenti-
cate its printout”).  The court highlighted its concerns that “someone other than
[the girlfriend] could have not only created the [Myspace profile], but also posted
the [post in question].” Id. at 424.  The court created a standard where social
media evidence could not be admitted “unless the court definitively determine[d]
that the evidence [wa]s authentic.”  Grimm et al., supra note 30, at 441.
37. See Griffin, 19 A.3d at 423 (explaining procedure for authentication under
FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 901(a) and MARYLAND RULE 5-901(b)(4)).
38. See id. at 427–28 (listing three methods of authenticating social media evi-
dence: (1) getting creator to testify whether he or she created profile and posted
message; (2) searching computer’s internet history and hard drive “to determine
whether that computer was used to originate the social networking profile and
posting in question”; or (3) “obtain[ing] information directly from the social
networking website that links the establishment of the profile to the person who
allegedly created it and also links the posting sought to be introduced to the per-
son who initiated it”).
39. 358 S.W.3d 633 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
40. Id. at 634 (providing background of case).
41. Id. at 636 (explaining defendant’s claims against admitting social media
evidence).
42. Id. at 638 (describing court’s standard for authentication of social media
evidence).
8
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thentic,” then the proffered evidence meets the authentication burden.43
This standard is significantly less restrictive and allows for authentication
of a greater proportion of social media evidence than the Griffin
standard.44
2. Texas’s Standard Gets the Most Likes
As more and more courts have begun to encounter evidentiary issues
about social media, many courts, including federal courts, have decided to
adopt the Texas Approach, as opposed to the Maryland Approach.45  For
example, in 2014, two cases—Parker v. State46 and United States v.
Vayner47—adopted the Texas Approach espoused in Tienda over the Mary-
land Approach in Griffin.48
In Parker v. State, the Delaware Supreme Court put aside the threat
that “social media evidence could be falsified” and relied on Rule 901 of
the Delaware Rules of Evidence to determine such evidence’s authenticity
and admissibility in trial.49  Similar to Tienda, the court held that the trial
judge “may admit the social media post when there is evidence ‘sufficient
43. See Grimm et al., supra note 30, at 441, 455.
44. See Angus-Anderson, supra note 32, at 37–38.
The “Maryland Approach [ ] [is] skeptical of social media evidence, finding
the odds too great that someone other than the alleged author of the evidence was
the actual creator” and therefore sets the bar high for attorneys to authenticate the
evidence. Id. The Texas Approach is “seen as more lenient” and transfers the
burden of production “to the objecting party to demonstrate that the evidence was
created or manipulated by a third party.” Id.
45. See id. at 38, 41 & n.74 (listing many more cases that follow Texas Ap-
proach than Maryland Approach).
46. 85 A.3d 682 (Del. 2014).
47. 769 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2014).
48. For a further discussion of Parker, see infra notes 49–50 and accompanying
text, and for a further discussion of Vayner, see infra notes 51–53.
49. See Parker, 85 A.3d at 687 (explaining reason for adopting Texas
Approach).
In Parker, the defendant was charged with second-degree assault and terroris-
tic threatening for an altercation with a friend regarding a mutual love interest.
See id. at 683.  Delaware attempted to introduce Facebook posts allegedly authored
by Parker after the altercation stating, among other things, “#caughtthatbit[*]h,”
and other statements referring to her own role in the altercation. See id. at 684
(providing content of Facebook entries).  The prosecutor presented evidence
from the profile, as well as testimony from the other party to the altercation, to
authenticate the posts. See id. (describing authentication evidence, which included
“[Parker’s] picture, the name ‘Tiffanni Parker,’ and a time stamp for each entry,
stating that they were posted on [the day of the altercation]. . . .  The State used
testimony from Brown [the other party to the altercation], as well as circumstantial
evidence, to authenticate the Facebook entries”).  Parker was convicted of second-
degree assault, and on appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld the convic-
tion, rejecting the defendant’s claim that the Facebook posts had not been prop-
erly authenticated. See id. at 684, 688.
9
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to support a finding’ by a reasonable juror that the proffered evidence is
what its proponent claims it to be.”50
Relying on Rule 901 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Second
Circuit utilized the same reasonable juror standard articulated in Tienda
and Parker to rule on an issue of social media authentication in United
States v. Vayner.51  Similar to the Tienda court, the Vayner court recognized
that social media evidence could not be authenticated absent a finding
that the proffering party had presented sufficient evidence such that a rea-
sonable juror could conclude that the post in question was what its propo-
nent claimed it to be.52  Consequently, the Second Circuit declined to
admit posts from a social media page into evidence because sufficient evi-
dence had not been presented to support ownership of the account or
authorship of the posts at issue.53
3. Social Media Gets Caught in World Wide Web of Circumstantial Evidence
Because every social media post is unique, courts have not developed
a consistent set of rules regarding authentication of social media evi-
dence.54  Courts rely on various sources of circumstantial evidence
presented by litigants who seek to authenticate particular social media ac-
50. See id. at 688 (stating standard and finding evidence provided for authen-
tication “sufficient for the trial court to find that a reasonable juror could deter-
mine that the proffered evidence was authentic”).
51. See Vayner, 769 F.3d at 132–33 (utilizing reasonable juror standard to de-
termine authentication of VK.com profile).  The Vayner court applied the Federal
Rules of Evidence to social media authentication, requiring “evidence sufficient to
support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.” See id. at 132.
(quoting FED. R. EVID. 901(a)) (internal quotation marks omitted). See infra note
53 for details of Vayner court’s analysis.
52. See id. at 132–33 (holding social media evidence not properly authenti-
cated).  The court found that the prosecution did not meet its burden of demon-
strating authenticity, finding the prosecution’s reliance on the personal
information in the defendant’s profile insufficient, as other parties knew all of that
information and could have falsely created a profile in the defendant’s name. See
id. at 132 (“[T]he information contained on the VK page allegedly tying the page
to [the defendant] was also known by [the witness] and likely others, some of
whom may have had reasons to create a profile page falsely attributed to the
defendant.”).
53. See id. at 128–29, 131–32 (describing prosecution’s attempts to authenti-
cate VK page).  Here, the prosecution argued that because information about the
defendant appeared on the VK page, including his name, photograph, and some
details about his life, it sufficiently indicated that the page belonged to the defen-
dant. See id.  However, the court rejected this argument, finding such evidence
insufficient for authentication. See id. at 132 (“[C]ontrary to the government’s ar-
gument, the mere fact that a page with [the defendant’s] name and photograph
happened to exist on the Internet at the time of [the witness’s] testimony does not
permit a reasonable conclusion that this page was created by the defendant or on
his behalf.”).
54. See generally Grimm et al., supra note 30 (addressing disparity in authenti-
cation standards used by courts).
10
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counts and communications.55  Parties typically offer testimony by the re-
cipient of a particular message as evidence of the message’s authenticity.56
55. See State v. Eleck, 23 A.3d 818, 822 (Conn. App. Ct.) (describing several
ways in which litigant may successfully authenticate social media post), cert. granted
mem. in part by 30 A.3d 2 (Conn. 2011), and aff’d on other grounds by 100 A.3d 817
(Conn. 2014).
The ways in which the litigant may authenticate include the following:
(1) A witness with personal knowledge may testify that the offered evi-
dence is what its proponent claims it to be. . . . (3) The trier of fact or an
expert witness can authenticate a contested item of evidence by compar-
ing it with preauthenticated specimens. . . . (4) The distinctive character-
istics of an object, writing or other communication, when considered in
conjunction with the surrounding circumstances, may provide sufficient
circumstantial evidence of authenticity.
Id. (alterations in original) (internal quotations omitted).  The court suggested
that a combination of these factors may provide sufficient evidence of authenticity.
See id.
56. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 926 N.E.2d 1162, 1171–72 (Mass. 2010)
(finding testimony of recipient of Facebook messages insufficient for authentica-
tion); Smith v. State, 136 So. 3d 424, 431, 436 (Miss. 2014) (same); Campbell v.
State, 382 S.W.3d 545, 551 (Tex. Ct. App. 2012) (holding testimony from recipient
of Facebook messages sufficient for authentication).
In Smith, the defendant was convicted of capital murder of his wife’s seven-
teen-month-old child. See Smith, 136 So. 3d at 426.  Mississippi sought to introduce
two Facebook messages allegedly from the defendant to his wife that purported to
discuss the defendant’s problems with the child: “[I] feel my temper building and
[I] know [I] will hurt someone . . . .” See id. at 430 (alterations in original) (inter-
nal quotations omitted).  To authenticate the messages, the defendant’s wife testi-
fied that he would send her messages on Facebook and that these particular
messages were sent by the defendant. See id. at 430–31.  The Supreme Court of
Mississippi held that “the State failed to provide evidence sufficient to support a
finding that the Facebook messages from Smith were what the State claimed.” See
id. at 434.  In so holding, the court noted that the defendant’s wife did not testify
as to how she knew that the defendant actually authored the Facebook messages
and that, because there was no testimony regarding the security of or access to the
defendant’s Facebook account and no information in the messages that was known
only to the defendant, the messages had not been properly authenticated. See id.
at 434–35.
Similarly, in Williams, the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder,
partly due to evidence presented of MySpace messages allegedly sent by the defen-
dant’s brother to one of the State’s witnesses, urging the witness not to testify
against the defendant or to claim a lack of memory about the events that occurred
on the night of the murder. See Williams, 926 N.E.2d at 1165, 1171–72.  The court
found the messages inadmissible due to lack of authentication because the State’s
only evidence for authentication was one witness’s testimony that the messages
were sent by the defendant’s brother. See id. at 1172–73 (noting testimony “estab-
lished that the messages were sent by someone with access to Williams’s MySpace
Web page, [but] it did not identify the person who actually sent the
communication”).
In Campbell, the defendant was convicted of aggravated assault with a deadly
weapon, and during the trial, Texas presented Facebook messages allegedly sent to
the victim by the defendant as evidence. See Campbell, 382 S.W.3d at 546, 548.  The
only evidence Texas presented for authentication was the victim’s testimony that
she received the messages from the defendant a few days after the assault, did not
send them to herself, and did not have access to the defendant’s Facebook account
after the incident. See id.  at 550.  The defendant argued that this evidence was
11
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While this testimony supports a claim of authorship, a majority of courts
have held that, absent some additional evidence, mere testimony from the
recipient of messages is not sufficient for authentication.57  Because social
media accounts can be accessed by anyone who has the account’s
username and password, authorship of particular posts can be difficult to
prove.58  In some cases, a party may authenticate social media evidence
either through particular testimony that confirms information in a post or
message known only to a small number of people, or through the actions
of the alleged author that confirm the information in the posts or
messages.59
insufficient to demonstrate that the messages were in fact from his Facebook ac-
count. See id. at 547 (providing defendant’s assertion that “there is no evidence
that the messages are in fact from [defendant’s] Facebook account”).  Here, the
court held that the victim’s testimony was sufficient to authenticate the Facebook
messages, finding that “there was prima facie evidence such that a reasonable jury
could have found that the Facebook messages were created by [the defendant].”
See id. at 553.
57. See, e.g., Williams, 926 N.E.2d at 1172 (holding testimony by witness relat-
ing to authorship of messages was not enough evidence to support authentica-
tion); Smith, 136 So. 3d at 434 (finding testimony by message recipient insufficient
for authentication).  The Williams court analogized the MySpace post at issue to a
telephone call, explaining that “a witness’s testimony that he or she has received
an incoming call from a person claiming to be ‘A,’ without more, [would be] insuf-
ficient evidence to admit the call as a conversation with ‘A.’” See Williams, 926
N.E.2d at 1172.  The court noted that additional testimony regarding page security
and accessibility was necessary to authenticate the messages. See id. (describing
additional information needed to authenticate MySpace page, including “how se-
cure such a Web page is, who can access a MySpace Web page, whether codes are
needed for such access, etc.”).
58. See Campbell, 382 S.W.3d at 550 (noting electronic communications are
particularly susceptible to fabrication and manipulation).  In Campbell, the court
noted two particular concerns associated with authenticating social media evi-
dence: first, because any person could establish a profile under any name, the
person viewing a profile would have no way of knowing for certain whether the
profile was legitimate; and second, because Facebook accounts can be accessed by
anyone with the account’s username and password, a person viewing communica-
tions from a particular account cannot be certain that the author is the actual
owner of the profile. See id. (explaining court’s skepticism regarding social media
evidence).
59. See, e.g., State v. Eleck, 23 A.3d 818, 822 (Conn. App. Ct.) (holding prima
facie showing of authenticity may be made through use of surrounding circum-
stances), cert. granted mem. in part by 30 A.3d 2 (Conn. 2011), and aff’d on other
grounds by 100 A.3d 817 (Conn. 2014); Commonwealth v. Foster F., 20 N.E.3d 967,
971 (Mass. App. Ct. 2014); Boyd v. State, 175 So. 3d 1, 5–6 (Miss. 2015) (finding
defendant’s actions that confirmed content of Facebook messages sufficient to au-
thenticate messages).  In Foster F., the defendant allegedly sent messages to three
girls and, in the course of those messages, set up a plan to meet them in a particu-
lar location on a particular date to play a “‘dating game.’” See Foster F., 20 N.E.3d
at 970.  The defendant met the girls in that location on that date, and while at-
tempting to play this game, the defendant allegedly sexually assaulted one of the
girls. See id.  The court found that, because these actions provided sufficient cir-
cumstances confirming the content of the messages, the posts were properly au-
thenticated and were thus admissible. See id. at 971 (finding “[t]he judge could
12
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Because social media communications must originate from a specific
account, personal information from a particular account profile, such as
photographs, location information, and personal details, can be a useful
tool for litigants attempting to authenticate messages or posts originating
from that account.60  Courts differ in their willingness to accept personal
have concluded, based on the proffered evidence, that it was the juvenile who
authored the Facebook messages to the victim”).
Similarly, in Boyd, the defendant was convicted of sending sexually suggestive
Facebook messages to a minor. See Boyd, 175 So. 3d at 7.  The defendant argued
“‘[t]he Facebook messages did not contain any personal identifying information’
and that ‘[w]ith nothing more to properly authenticate’ the trial court should have
excluded the Facebook messages from evidence.” See id. at 5 (alterations in origi-
nal).  The court allowed the messages to be admitted over the defendant’s objec-
tion because the defendant was carrying a cell phone that had the same six digits
as the creator of the Facebook message claimed to have and “was arrested at the
time and meeting place arranged in text messages originating” from that cell
phone. See id. at 6 (“We find the Facebook messages were properly admitted con-
sidering the circumstances laid out [ ].”).
60. See Nicholas O. McCann, Tips for Authenticating Social Media Evidence, 100
ILL. B.J. 482, 484 (2012) (noting courts vary in allowing authentication based on
“unique identifying characteristics” of profile in question); see also Moore v. State,
763 S.E.2d 670, 674 (Ga. 2014) (allowing authentication of Facebook profile via
pictures, hometown, cell phone number, use of nickname, and personal details on
profile); Burgess v. State, 742 S.E.2d 464, 467 (Ga. 2013) (finding pictures, nick-
names, age, and location on MySpace profile sufficient for authentication of ac-
count). But see Eleck, 23 A.3d at 821 (holding username and profile picture
insufficient to authenticate Facebook profile).
In Burgess, the defendant was convicted on several charges for his involvement
in a drive-by shooting. See Burgess, 742 S.E.2d at 466 (providing disposition of
court).  At trial, the prosecution introduced evidence from a MySpace profile al-
legedly belonging to the defendant and attempted to authenticate the profile us-
ing the username, age, hometown of the user, personal information about the
user, and photographs of the defendant on the page. See id. at 467 (describing
evidence presented for authentication).  The court held that this evidence was suf-
ficient to authenticate the MySpace page as belonging to the defendant. See id. at
467 (“In this case, there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to authenticate the
printout from the MySpace profile page.”).
Similarly, in Moore, the defense challenged the prosecution’s attempt to use
evidence from a Facebook profile allegedly belonging to the defendant based on
lack of authentication. See Moore, 763 S.E.2d at 672–74 (providing factual back-
ground and noting Appellant’s objection that “the Facebook page was not prop-
erly authenticated and there was insufficient evidence to prove that Appellant
actually made the comments on the page”).  The court held that the profile had
been properly authenticated through testimony that confirmed the picture on the
page was of the defendant, the hometown listed was the defendant’s, the cell
phone number listed on the page was the defendant’s, the name on the profile was
the defendant’s nickname, and the page contained details about the defendant’s
life that were not public knowledge. See id.
Conversely, the court in Eleck found that information taken from a Facebook
profile was insufficient for authentication. See Eleck, 23 A.3d at 825.  In Eleck, the
defendant was convicted of assault in the first degree by means of a dangerous
instrument. See id. at 819.  During trial, the defendant offered evidence of
messages purportedly sent to him by the victim from her Facebook account in an
attempt to impeach her credibility. See id. at 820 (summarizing introduction of
Facebook messages allegedly sent by victim to defendant after the altercation at
issue).  The defendant attempted to authenticate the messages by testifying that
13
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profile information as ample evidence of authentication.61  However, if
the opposing party does not claim that multiple parties have access to a
particular profile, personal information from that profile may suffice to
authenticate communications from that profile.62
the username was one that he recognized as belonging to the victim, that the pro-
file contained photographs and other entries identifying the victim as the owner of
the account, and that she had removed him as a friend the day after he testified to
this effect. See id. at 821.  The court found that this was insufficient evidence be-
cause the defendant had not demonstrated that the messages were in fact written
by the victim. See id. at 824 (noting victim’s testimony denying authorship of
messages; finding defendant failed to “advance other foundational proof to au-
thenticate that the proffered messages did, in fact, come from [the victim] and not
simply from [victim’s] Facebook account”).  The court gave weight to the victim’s
testimony that her account had been hacked, noting that this “highlight[ed] the
general lack of security” of Facebook accounts. See id. at 824 (finding victim’s testi-
mony “highlights the general lack of security . . . and raises an issue as to whether a
third party may have sent the messages via [victim’s] account”).
61. Compare Dering v. State, 465 S.W.3d 668, 672 (Tex. Ct. App. 2015) (hold-
ing names and photos from Facebook profile were insufficient basis for authentica-
tion), and Eleck, 23 A.3d at 822 (finding information taken from witness’s Facebook
profile insufficient to authenticate messages sent from that account), with Moore,
763 S.E.2d at 674 (finding personal information and photographs of defendant on
Facebook profile sufficient for authentication). See supra note 60 for detailed facts
of Eleck and Moore.
In Dering, the defendant sought to transfer venue from its current location
because he felt he “could not obtain a fair and impartial trial” as evidenced by the
multitude of Facebook posts from third parties, none of whom testified in the case.
See Dering, 465 S.W.3d at 670 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Moreover, the
posts were neither made on the defendant’s account nor made by the defendant.
See id.  Wanting to stay in the current venue, “[t]he State objected to the admission
of the Facebook posts because they were not properly authenticated.” See id.  The
court agreed with Texas, finding that no evidence had been presented to support
the claim that the posts were actually written by the purported author. See id. at
672 (“There was no evidence of the authenticity of who the purported author was
of any of the Facebook posts.  All that [the defendant] offered in terms of authen-
ticity were the names and photos as shown on the accounts of the owner and pos-
ters. Without more, this evidence is insufficient to support a finding of
authenticity.”).  The Dering court held that the posts at issue were not properly
authenticated because the defendant failed to present circumstantial evidence that
the posts were actually created by the alleged authors. See id. (describing circum-
stantial evidence presented and finding it “insufficient to support a finding of
authenticity”).
Similarly, the Eleck court emphasized a need for additional circumstantial evi-
dence beyond the personal information on the profile at issue. See Eleck, 23 A.3d at
823 (“An electronic document may . . . be authenticated by traditional means such
as . . . circumstantial evidence of ‘distinctive characteristics’ in the document that
identify the author.”).  In contrast, the Moore court found the amount of personal
information on the defendant’s profile, as well as the presence of details that were
not public knowledge, sufficient circumstantial evidence to authenticate the social
media evidence. See Moore, 763 S.E.2d at 674 (“Based on this direct and circum-
stantial evidence, we find that the Facebook page was properly authenticated.”).
62. See Moore, 763 S.E.2d at 674 (holding defendant’s nickname, location,
photographs, and biographical information sufficient to authenticate Facebook
profile without considering profile security as a factor weighing against authentica-
tion); Wilson v. State, 30 N.E.3d 1264, 1269 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (allowing authen-
tication based on circumstantial evidence and not addressing profile security
14
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C. To Share or Not to Share: Authentication Concerns Based on Ease of Access
Authentication of any message or post on a social media account is
complicated by the ease with which anyone can access the account.63  So-
cial media evidence presents two separate concerns regarding authentica-
tion: first, anyone can make a profile under a fictitious name, and second,
a person can access another’s profile simply by attaining the profile’s
username and password.64  In either instance, a viewer cannot be sure
whether the profile is legitimate or even who actually authored a particu-
lar post.65  These concerns are enhanced by the fact that many users will
concerns). But see Eleck, 23 A.3d at 824 (emphasizing general lack of security of
Facebook accounts).
The Moore court relied on the wealth of personal information on the defen-
dant’s profile to confirm authentication. See Moore, 763 S.E.2d at 674 (finding testi-
mony confirming “that the picture on the Facebook page was of [defendant] and
[ ] that [defendant’s] hometown was Gary, Indiana, as listed on the page[,]”
among other information, such as defendant’s nickname, “structure and style of
the comments posted on the page,” and cell phone number, which were all on
Facebook page, were sufficient to authenticate social media evidence).  In Moore,
the court did not consider profile security as a factor weighing against authentica-
tion, as the objecting party did not present evidence suggesting shared access to
the profile. See generally id. (finding sufficient evidence for authentication of social
media evidence without addressing skepticism for security of social media
account).
In Wilson, the court did not consider security concerns regarding social media
accounts and found the defendant’s Twitter profile was authentic based on a wit-
ness’s testimony regarding her communications with the defendant via Twitter, as
well as the photos posted from the account and references to gangs with whom the
defendant was known to be affiliated. See Wilson, 30 N.E.3d at 1268–69 (“[T]aken
together, the witness testimony identifying the Twitter account as belonging to
[the defendant] and the content posted on the account . . . are more than suffi-
cient to authenticate the Twitter posts . . . .”).  In comparison, in Eleck, because the
alleged author of the posts testified that her Facebook account had been hacked,
the court required that the defendant counter her testimony with evidence sup-
porting his claim that, despite the possibility that others had accessed the account,
a reasonable juror could still conclude that the alleged author created the posts at
issue. See Eleck, 23 A.3d at 824 (finding testimony that account had been hacked
“highlights the general lack of security of the medium and raises an issue as to
whether a third party may have sent the messages via [the witness’s] account”).
63. See Campbell, 382 S.W.3d at 550 (noting electronic communications are
particularly susceptible to fabrication and manipulation).  For additional discus-
sion of Campbell, see supra note 56.  The Campbell court emphasized that “the fact
that an electronic communication on its face purports to originate from a certain
person’s social networking account is generally insufficient standing alone to au-
thenticate that person as the author of the communication.” See id. at 549.
64. See id. (discussing twofold concern regarding authentication of Facebook
posts).
65. The court in Campbell recognized that electronic forms of communication
may be especially susceptible to manipulation and falsification. See id. at 549–50
(“However, in evaluating whether an electronic communication has been suffi-
ciently linked to the purported author, we recognize that electronic communica-
tions are susceptible to fabrication and manipulation.”).  Concerns about third
parties either creating profiles under fictitious identities or sending communica-
tions through another person’s account therefore create significant authentication
concerns. See id. at 550.
15
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store their account passwords either on their computers or through cell
phone apps, which allows third parties to access social media accounts sim-
ply by having control of the account holder’s cell phone or computer.66
Because profiles can easily be fabricated or accessed by multiple peo-
ple, parties seeking to admit social media evidence who do not sufficiently
demonstrate the actual authorship of a proffered post will not meet the
burden of authentication.67  Some courts require parties to present expert
testimony demonstrating profile security and how easily a person could
either create an account or access another person’s account.68  Courts
66. See Social Networking Fact Sheet, supra note 4 (finding 40% of cell phone
users access social network via phones).  According to this study, as of 2012, an
estimated 28% of cell phone users reported typically accessing their social media
accounts on their phones at least once per day. See id.; see also Eleck, 23 A.3d at 822
(“[A]ccount holders frequently remain logged in to their accounts while leaving
their computers and cell phones unattended.”).  The Eleck court acknowledged
cell phone access to social media increased the potential for a third party to access
another person’s social media account. See id. (noting practice of remaining
logged in to social media accounts subjects “passwords and website security . . . . to
compromise by hackers”).
67. See United States v. Vayner, 769 F.3d 125, 132 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding
social media posts not properly authenticated because of sufficient possibility
someone else could have authored posts).  In Vayner, at issue were posts allegedly
made by the defendant on VK.com, which is described to the court as the Russian
equivalent of Facebook. See id. at 128.  The only evidence presented by the prose-
cution was that an agent had viewed the page online and that it contained informa-
tion related to the defendant. See id. at 129.  The court found that, because no
additional evidence was presented that suggested the defendant had authored the
posts at issue, the posts were not properly authenticated. See id. at 131–32 (“The
government did not provide a sufficient basis on which to conclude that the prof-
fered printout was what the government claimed it to be . . . and there was thus
insufficient evidence to authenticate the VK page and to permit its consideration
by the jury.”).  The court recognized the possibility that someone else could have
authored the posts in the defendant’s name. See id. at 132 (“[T]here was no evi-
dence that [the defendant] himself had created the page or was responsible for its
contents.”).  Because nothing other than the defendant’s name and photograph
on the profile page suggested that he was the author of the posts, the court held
that the government failed to meets its burden to support a reasonable conclusion
that the posts were authored by the defendant. See id. (“[C]ontrary to the govern-
ment’s argument, the mere fact that a page with [the defendant’s] name and pho-
tograph happened to exist on the Internet at the time of [the agent’s] testimony
does not permit a reasonable conclusion that this page was created by the defen-
dant or on his behalf.”).
68. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Williams, 926 N.E.2d 1162, 1173 (Mass. 2010)
(holding MySpace profile was not properly authenticated because no testimony
was presented regarding profile security).  For detailed facts of Williams, see supra
note 56.
In Williams, the proffering party presented no witness testimony regarding
“how secure such a [MySpace] Web page is, who can access a Myspace Web page,
whether codes are needed for such access, etc.” See id. at 1172.  Witnesses testified
that messages were sent from the defendant’s MySpace page, but they did not
identify the actual sender of the messages. See id. at 1172–73.  Absent such a show-
ing, the court found that the messages had not been properly authenticated. See
id. at 1173 (“Here, while the foundational testimony established that the messages
were sent by someone with access to [the defendant’s] MySpace Web page, it did
16
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often indicate a need for specific testimony establishing that a particular
social media account could not possibly have been accessed by anyone
other than the account holder in order to sufficiently show that the ac-
count holder actually authored the communications at issue.69
III. #NOFILTER: SHARING ON SOCIAL MEDIA CONTRIBUTED TO CRIMINAL
CONVICTIONS IN SUBLET
In Sublet, the Maryland Court of Appeals reviewed three cases raising
the issue of social media authentication.70  The court held that authentica-
tion of social media evidence requires proof from which a reasonable ju-
ror could find that the evidence was what the proponent claimed it to
be.71  As a result, the court declined to authenticate the Facebook posts at
issue in Sublet v. State and affirmed the authentication of both the Twitter
messages at issue in Harris v. State and the Facebook messages at issue in
Monge–Martinez v. State, thus upholding the convictions of all three
defendants.72
A. Sublet v. State
The Anne Arundel County Circuit Court convicted the petitioner, Al-
bert Sublet (Sublet), of two counts of second-degree assault and sentenced
him to ten years imprisonment for his involvement in an altercation with
Chrishell Parker (Parker).73  Sublet claimed that Parker instigated the al-
not identify the person who actually sent the communication.  Nor was there ex-
pert testimony that no one other than [the defendant] could communicate from
that Web page.”).
69. See id.  The Williams court held the proffered MySpace messages inadmissi-
ble based on a failure to present evidence showing that no one else could possibly
have accessed the profile to send the messages. See id. (“Testimony regarding the
contents of the [Myspace] messages should not have been admitted.”).
70. See Sublet v. State, 113 A.3d 695, 697–708 (Md. 2015) (consolidating Sub-
let v. State, 2014 Md. LEXIS 370 (Ct. Spec. App. 2014) (unpublished table deci-
sion), Harris v. State, 99 A.3d 778 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2014) (unpublished table
decision), and Monge–Martinez v. State, 99 A.3d 778 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2014)
(unpublished table decision) into this appeal).
71. See id. at 718 (announcing court’s authentication standard).  In analyzing
the facts of each case, the court relied on the Maryland rule for authentication of
evidence, which states, “The requirement of authentication or identification as a
condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a
finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” MD. R. 5-901(a).
This rule is based off of the federal evidentiary rule governing authentication,
which states, “To satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item
of evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding
that the item is what the proponent claims it is.” FED. R. EVID. 901(a).
72. See Sublet, 113 A.3d at 719–22 (discussing court’s decision in Sublet, Harris,
and Monge–Martinez).
73. See id. at 701 (describing disposition of lower court).  Sublet was initially
charged “with three counts of first degree assault, second degree assault and reck-
less endangerment, as well as with one count of carrying a deadly weapon with
intent to injure.” Id. at 698.
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tercation and sought to introduce into evidence four printed pages alleg-
edly from Parker’s Facebook page that supported this contention.74  On
the fourth page of the document, a post from “Cece Parker,” admittedly
Parker’s account, stated, among other things, that “her [boyfriend—alleg-
edly, Sublet] is a dead man walkn.”75  Parker, while admitting that she had
authored the other entries in the document posted by “Cece Parker,” de-
nied having authored this particular statement.76  Parker also explained
that because she shared her username and password with other people, it
was possible someone else could have posted this message from her
account.77
The trial court sustained Maryland’s objection to admission of the
Facebook conversation based on its findings that Parker’s password was
not a secret, that another person could have presumably accessed her ac-
count and posted from it, and that Sublet’s attorney did not present any
expert testimony disputing Parker’s explanation.78  The Maryland Court
of Appeals agreed with the trial court’s assessment that the document had
not been properly authenticated and affirmed Sublet’s conviction.79  In
74. See id. at 698–99.  The Facebook post at issue involved a conversation be-
tween seven different Facebook users and consisted of comments to a status ini-
tially posted on the public Facebook profile of one of the conversation’s
participants. See id. at 699–700.
75. See id. at 700–01 (describing Parker’s testimony regarding Facebook
conversation).  Parker did not dispute the authenticity of the first three pages
of the document, but she testified that she had not written the entries on the
last page—which contained the threat at issue—and “did not understand where
they came from.” Id. at 701.
76. See id. at 700–01 (providing Parker’s testimony).  When Sublet’s attorney
questioned Parker about the post that read, “[H]er bf is a dead man walkn,” the
prosecution objected, arguing that this particular post had not been properly au-
thenticated. See id. at 700.
77. See id. at 701 (noting prosecution’s challenges to authentication of
Facebook posts).  Parker admitted ownership of the Facebook account belonging
to Cece Parker but noted that she shared her password with other people, includ-
ing at least one of the other participants in the conversation at issue. See id.
(“Parker explained that she ‘[gave] her logout name and password to other peo-
ple’ . . . .” (first alteration in original)).
78. See id. (noting trial court’s reasoning in declining to authenticate
Facebook posts).  The trial court found that, because Parker’s testimony cast doubt
regarding authorship of the particular post, the defense failed to provide sufficient
evidence for authentication. See id. (“The trial judge [ ] sustained the State’s ob-
jection to admission of [the Facebook posts], based upon three findings: that Ms.
Parker’s password was not a secret, that other people could and had presumably
accessed and changed or inserted information on Ms. Parker’s Facebook page,
thereby attributing it to her, and that Ms. Parker’s explanation was not disputed by
expert testimony . . . .”).
79. See id. at 718–19 (affirming Sublet’s conviction).  The court of appeals
noted that, “when a witness denies having personal knowledge of the creation of
the item to be authenticated, that denial necessarily undercuts the notion of au-
thenticity.” Id. at 723 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The court also found
that “Sublet’s argument that Ms. Parker’s credibility was for the jury to determine
misses the mark, because her denial of authenticity of the page undermined its
admissibility.” Id. at 719.
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reaching its decision, the court noted that Sublet had not presented suffi-
cient evidence such that a reasonable juror could have found the pages to
be authentic.80
B. Harris v. State
The issue in Harris v. State stemmed from an attempt to introduce
evidence from the defendant’s Twitter account.81  In Harris, a fight broke
out at a local high school, and James, a student at the school, punched
petitioner Tavares Harris’s (Harris) friend, Keon.82  Harris then allegedly
planned to shoot Jared, a friend of James’s, in retaliation.83  The next day,
Jared and another party were both shot and injured, allegedly by Harris.84
Harris was convicted and sentenced to twenty years in prison for first-de-
gree assault and the use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of
violence.85
At Harris’s trial, Maryland sought to introduce private, direct Twitter
messages and public tweets obtained from two cell phones “recovered
from Harris’s person.”86  The direct Twitter messages showed a conversa-
tion between the users “OMGitsLOCO” and “TheyLovingTc.”87  A friend
of Harris’s testified that Harris was the owner of the Twitter handle
“TheyLovingTc.”88  The direct messages sent by “TheyLovingTc” included
80. See id. at 718–19 (providing list of reasons court considered when declin-
ing to authenticate).
81. See id. at 702 (providing principal issue of Harris).
82. See id. (describing initial altercation).  The four parties involved in the
fight were Harris and his friend Keon on one side, Jared and his friend James on
the other, and the fight allegedly broke out because Jared planned to rob Keon.
See id.
83. See id. (introducing social media evidence at issue).  Harris’s alleged plan
to shoot Jared C. was discovered after the shooting through an analysis of private
messages and public tweets sent via Harris’s Twitter account. See id. (noting Mary-
land’s use of expert witness to testify to “analysis and interpretation of digital evi-
dence recovered during the investigation” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
84. See id. (describing shooting for which Harris was convicted).
85. See id. at 706 (discussing trial court’s decision in Harris).  Harris was ini-
tially charged with “two counts of attempted first degree murder, two counts of
attempted second degree murder, two counts of assault in the first degree, two
counts of use of a handgun in the commission of a felony and one count of con-
spiracy to commit murder.” Id. at 702.
86. See id. at 703 (describing social media evidence presented).  The direct
messages were recovered from an iPhone seized in the course of a police search of
Harris’s bedroom, and the public tweets were found on an Android phone seized
from Harris’s person. See id. at 702–03.
87. See id. at 703 (discussing content of conversation via two Twitter ac-
counts).  The iPhone was identified as belonging to Foulke, a friend of Harris’s,
who was found to be the owner of the Twitter handle, “OMGitsLOCO.” See id. at
703, 705.
88. See id. at 705 (detailing process by which State demonstrated ownership of
relevant Twitter accounts).  Witness testimony, as well as the profile picture for the
account, sufficiently proved that Harris was the owner of the account with the Twit-
ter handle, “TheyLovingTc.” See id. at 706.
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a statement expressing a desire to “avenge keon” and another stating,
“[T]ell them bitch ass n[****]s to come to the farm cuz I don’t feel safe
shooting them right by the police station unless we got the car.”89  Public
tweets, posted by “TheyLovingTc” and accompanied by a profile picture
identified as belonging to Harris, included statements such as “Sh[*]t
finna get real tomorrow” and “F[*]ck Probation im all in tomorrow.”90
According to the timestamps on both the private messages and the public
tweets, the communications were sent the night before the shooting
occurred.91
The trial court found that Maryland had successfully authenticated
both the private messages and public tweets.92  First, Maryland called a
police detective who testified that he used forensic software to identify the
cell phones from which the private messages were sent.93  Next, a friend of
Harris’s testified that Harris owned the Twitter handle “TheyLovingTc,”
thus independently verifying the account.94  The trial court found the tes-
timony of these two witnesses sufficient to authenticate the private
89. See id. at 703–04 (second alteration in original) (providing content of pri-
vate messages recovered from cell phones).  The messages also contained refer-
ence to a shooting and noted a desire to exact revenge. See id.  (“[T]hey should
have neva f[*]cked wit Y2C bra it’s game ova[.]”).
90. See id. at 705–06 (discussing profile evidence linking tweets to defendant).
The trial judge found the defendant’s profile picture, which appeared next to the
tweets, and Harris’s username, which matched the username in the private
messages, combined with the fact that the tweets “contained content that would
only have been created by a few people,” was sufficient for authenticating the so-
cial media evidence. See id. at 706 (internal quotation marks omitted).
91. See id. at 705 (presenting timestamps of communications).  The times-
tamps on each communication at issue indicated that they were sent on May 17,
2012, and the shooting occurred on May 18, 2012. See id. at 702, 705.  The times-
tamp on the public tweets indicated they were posted within an hour of the already
authenticated private messages. Id.
92. See id. at 706 (explaining trial court’s ruling on defendant’s authentica-
tion objection). See supra notes 86–91 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the circumstantial evidence the trial court relied on in allowing the messages and
posts to be admitted over the defendant’s objection.
93. See id. at 705 (detailing technical evidence State presented for authentica-
tion).  The detective testified that through the use of special forensic software, he
was able to compile the conversations and determine that the direct messages sent
from the iPhone were authored by “OMGitsLOCO” and that the iPhone received
messages from “TheyLovingTc.” See id.  Detective Grimes was able to perform a
full forensic examination of the iPhone, which included accessing the phone’s
“contacts, the call logs, . . . images, . . . videos, [and] Twitter chats . . . .” See id.
(first, second, and third alterations in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
94. See id. (discussing independent witness verification of posts).  Jahmil, a
friend of Harris’s, testified based on personal knowledge that Harris owned the
Twitter handle, “TheyLovingTc.” See id. at 705–06.  The court found that this was
sufficient independent verification of the account. See id. at 706 (holding evidence
properly authenticated).
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messages.95  The trial judge then concluded that the public tweets were
also properly authenticated, because they were authored at the same time
as the direct messages and contained information that only a few people
could have known.96  The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s deci-
sion, finding that there were sufficient distinctive characteristics from
which the trial judge could have determined that a reasonable juror could
find the direct messages and tweets authentic.97
C. Monge–Martinez v. State
In the third case, Monge–Martinez v. State, petitioner Carlos Alberto
Monge–Martinez (Monge–Martinez) was convicted and sentenced to thir-
teen years in prison for second-degree assault and openly carrying a dan-
gerous weapon with the intent to injure.98  The incident involved an
altercation between Monge–Martinez and his former girlfriend, Dorothy
Ana Santa Maria (Santa Maria), which resulted in Santa Maria being
stabbed.99  At trial, Maryland attempted to introduce private Facebook
messages allegedly sent to Santa Maria by Monge–Martinez.100  The
messages were sent from a profile user named Carlos Monge on the same
day as the altercation, and in the messages, the sender apologized to Santa
Maria, asked her for forgiveness, reproached her for deceiving him, and
expressed his love for her.101  Monge–Martinez’s attorney objected to the
admission of these messages based on a lack of proper authentication.102
95. See id. at 704 (“The trial judge determined that [the private messages]
were properly authenticated, because, along with the proffer of Detective Grimes’s
testimony, there was independent verification of the Twitter account . . . .”).
96. See id. at 706 (describing circumstantial evidence used to authenticate
public tweets).
97. See id. at 722 (stating court of appeals’ holding).
98. See id. at 708 (providing trial court’s disposition in Monge–Martinez).
Monge–Martinez was charged with “attempted second degree murder and two
counts each of first degree assault, second degree assault and reckless endanger-
ment . . . .” Id. at 707.
99. See id. at 707 (providing details of altercation at issue in Monge–Martinez).
The prosecution claimed that Monge–Martinez “intentionally instigated the fight,”
while  Monge–Martinez argued that “he was defending himself from Ms. Santa
Maria.” See id.
100. See id. (introducing evidence presented by Maryland).  Maryland at-
tempted to use these messages to show that Monge–Martinez expressed remorse
for his actions, which would counter his claim of self-defense. See id.
101. See id. (describing content of Facebook messages at issue).  Maryland
presented printed out copies of three messages: the first asked for forgiveness, the
second included a statement by the author that he or she “no longer want[ed] to
live with this,” and the third expressed love for Santa Maria but also claimed that
she deceived the author. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  The times-
tamps of the messages indicated that they were sent on the afternoon of April 23,
2012, the same day that the altercation at issue occurred. See id. at 707, 721.
102. See id. at 707 (stating defense’s objections to admission of Facebook
messages).  The defense argued that the messages were not properly authenticated
because nothing in them referred specifically to the altercation at issue. See id.
(“Monge–Martinez’s attorney objected to [the messages’] admission on the basis
21
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The court of appeals upheld Monge–Martinez’s conviction, finding
that the State presented sufficient circumstantial evidence to authenticate
the Facebook messages.103  The court of appeals agreed with the trial
court in finding that Santa Maria’s testimony, the timestamps of the
messages, the fact that the messages were written in Monge–Martinez’s
native language of Spanish, and the allusions in the messages to the stab-
bing, sufficiently met the threshold of required circumstantial evidence
for authentication.104  Notably, the court found that the authenticity in-
quiry was context-specific and that there was no requirement that bio-
graphical information be present on the Facebook profile in order to
authenticate the messages.105
IV. AUTHENTICATION STANDARD GETS STATUS UPDATE IN SUBLET
In Sublet, the Court of Appeals of Maryland attempted to clarify the
standard for authentication of social media evidence that the same court
elucidated in Griffin.106  In both Sublet and Griffin, the court applied the
that ‘the State will not be able to show any evidence that’s referring to the incident
on the 23rd.’”).
103. See id. at 722 (holding trial court did not err in admitting Facebook
messages in Monge–Martinez).  The court of appeals held that social media authen-
tication depends on the trial judge finding sufficient proof from which a reasona-
ble juror could find the evidence to be what its proponent claims it to be. See id.
(“We hold that, in order to authenticate evidence derived from a social networking
website, the trial judge must determine that there is proof from which a reasonable
juror could find that the evidence is what the proponent claims it to be.”).
104. See id. at 721 (discussing evidence presented by State in Monge–Martinez
in order to authenticate Facebook messages).  The trial court noted that the
messages possessed sufficient distinctive characteristics for authentication. See id.
at 721–22 (“The various communications from Monge–Martinez, together with the
limited number of people knowledgeable of the incident as well as the use of Span-
ish in each message was sufficient evidence upon which the trial judge could rely
to authenticate the Facebook messages.”).
105. See id. at 721 (“The lack of biographical information . . . does not, by
itself, prevent authentication, because the inquiry is context-specific; what may be
present, yet insufficient, in one case may not be required in another situation.”);
see also, e.g., United States v. Vayner, 769 F.3d 125, 132–33 (2d Cir. 2014) (finding
biographical information present on profile page insufficient to authenticate be-
cause information was known to many others and requiring more context-specific
information linking defendant to profile page).
106. See Sublet, 113 A.3d at 698 (“We shall hold that, in order to authenticate
evidence derived from a social networking website, the trial judge must determine
that there is proof from which a reasonable juror could find that the evidence is
what the proponent claims it to be.”); see also Griffin v. State, 19 A.3d 415, 423 (Md.
2011) (“[T]he ‘requirement of authentication or identification as a condition pre-
cedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that
the matter in question is what its proponent claims,’ to insure trustworthiness.”
(quoting Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 541–42 (D. Md. 2007))).
In Griffin, the court of appeals considered social media authentication as an
issue of first impression. Griffin, 19 A.3d at 422 (“[N]either we nor our appellate
brethren heretofore has considered [MARYLAND RULE 5-901’s] application to au-
thenticate pages printed from a social networking site.”).  The Griffin court re-
quired that the proffering party present evidence of sufficient distinctive
22
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol61/iss2/3
2016] NOTE 309
existing Maryland Rules of Evidence, noting that, while the rules do not
explicitly define authentication standards for social media, they provide
the basis by which all evidence should be authenticated.107
Although the court affirmed the trial courts’ determinations in all
three cases, three of seven judges dissented in the case of the first defen-
dant, Sublet.108  The dissent found the majority’s holding, which upheld
the exclusion of social media evidence, to be inconsistent with the other
two cases, which each upheld the admission of social media evidence.109
The dissent contended that the majority’s holding led to the creation of a
murky rule that could not be applied with consistency in the future.110
characteristics to demonstrate that the evidence at issue was actually created by the
person alleged to have created it. See id. at 424 (noting need for “greater degree of
authentication than merely identifying the date of birth of the creator and her . . .
photograph on the site” because of the “potential for abuse and manipulation of a
social networking site by someone other than its purported creator and/or user”).
Since Griffin, the use of social media in litigation has increased. Sublet, 113 A.3d at
713 (“In the period since Griffin had been decided, cases in which authentication
of social networking websites and postings has been addressed have proliferated.”).
107. See Sublet, 113 A.3d at 719–22 (applying MD. R. 5-901 to cases); see also
Griffin, 19 A.3d at 427 (providing three non-exclusive ways of authenticating social
media evidence based on MARYLAND’S RULE 5-901).  Neither the state nor the fed-
eral rule for authentication specifically addresses social media, but each provides a
general basis for the authentication of all evidence. See MD. R. 5-901; see also FED.
R. EVID. 901.  Commentators argue that the existing evidentiary rules provide a
sufficient basis for authentication and that no new rules are necessary to address
social media authentication. See, e.g., Democko, supra note 7, at 405 (arguing edu-
cation of judges and attorneys is more effective than attempting to craft new evi-
dentiary rule); Rosenthal, supra note 5, at 261 (noting current evidentiary rules
regarding discovery of evidence sufficient to handle discovery of social media evi-
dence as well).
108. See Sublet, 113 A.3d at 722 (announcing dissenting judges).
109. See id. at 722–23 (Adkins, J., dissenting in part) (disagreeing with major-
ity’s application of reasonable juror standard as applied to consolidated case, Sublet
v. State, 2014 Md. LEXIS 370  (Ct. Spec. App. 2014) (unpublished table decision)).
In disagreeing with the majority’s holding for the Sublet case, the dissent referred
to the “relatively low threshold for admissibility” and authentication the court
adopted in Harris and argued that the amount of circumstantial evidence
presented in Sublet should have been sufficient to meet that threshold. See id. at
723.  The dissent found unpersuasive Parker’s claims that, although she authored
the posts on the first three pages, she was not responsible for the posts on the final
page. See id. at 724 (“If we step back and put ourselves in the jury box, can we say
that we would be unreasonable if we concluded that not only did Ms. Parker au-
thor the posts under her profile that appear on page one, but that she continued
the conversation as shown on page four of the print-out?”).
110. See id. at 725 (arguing Sublet ruling created unclear standard).  Based on
the context and content of the messages, the dissent posited that, not only would it
be reasonable for a juror to conclude that Parker was the author, “it would be the
unusual juror who would not draw that conclusion.” See id. at 724.
The dissent compared the facts of Sublet to the Delaware Supreme Court’s
holding in Parker v. State, 85 A.3d 682 (Del. 2014). See id. at 724–45 (analyzing
Parker court’s discussion of authentication).  They argued that the Parker court’s
holding was more appropriate in relation to the case at issue, especially because
the “evidence supporting authentication of the Facebook entries in [Sublet] [wa]s
stronger than in Parker.” See id. at 725.  The dissent, in comparing the two cases,
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A. Court’s Timeline Shows Use of Past Cases to Inform Sublet Decision
The Sublet court began its analysis by recognizing the unique chal-
lenges presented by social media authentication.111  Unlike other sources
of evidence, authorship of social media posts can be complicated by a
number of factors relating to the anonymity and ease of access of social
media sites.112  Authentication of social media thus links inextricably with
an analysis of the actual ownership of a profile and the ease with which
parties other than the actual owner can access a particular account.113
The Sublet court next referred to its holding four years prior in Griffin,
noting that the Maryland Court of Appeals grappled with social media au-
thentication for the first time in that case.114  The Sublet court noted that,
while Griffin provided a foundation for its future jurisprudence, the issue
claimed that the majority’s decision in Sublet set the bar for authentication too
high and “muddled” the court’s traditional “reasonable juror” standard. See id.
[T]he Majority set bad precedent in holding that a trial judge can estab-
lish such a high bar for authentication as the court did in the Sublet case.
The Majority muddled our “reasonable juror” standard by refusing to ac-
cept Facebook posts as authenticated, based on an undisputed admission
by the witness that she made posts referring to the fight at the party in a
Facebook conversation with friends the day after the party, but denying
the posts on the same topic occurring shortly thereafter.
Id.
111. See id. at 710–11 (majority opinion) (discussing authentication of writ-
ings and noting unique challenges of social media).  The Sublet court began by
noting that authentication, for many types of written evidence, is accomplished
through determining authorship. See id. at 710 (“The most straightforward ap-
proach to authenticating a writing is to ask an individual with personal knowledge
about the document whether the matter was what it purported to be.”).  With so-
cial media, however, such analysis becomes especially challenging. See id. at 711
(“[T]raditional opportunities for authentication are reduced by the lack of hand-
writing, the absence of a physical location of the document and the inherent ano-
nymity provided by posting on websites.”).
112. See id. (discussing anonymity and ease of access to social media ac-
counts).  The court discussed the process by which a social media profile is cre-
ated, noting that, although a person must provide biographical information in
order to create a profile, “there doesn’t appear to be a way to validate such infor-
mation before a page can be created.” See id. (internal quotation marks omitted)
(noting court’s concern of inability to validate creator of profile).  Further, owners
of social media profiles frequently, as in Sublet, share their login and password
information with other people, which adds another layer of complication when
trying to assess the authenticity of a profile or post. See id. at 701, 712 (presenting
Parker’s claim in Sublet that her password was known by others).
113. See id. at 712 (finding authentication of social media complicated by in-
ability to confirm identity of profile’s creator and ease with which accounts can be
accessed by others); see also Griffin v. State, 19 A.3d 415, 421 (Md. 2011)
(“[A]nyone can create a fictitious account and masquerade under another per-
son’s name or can gain access to another’s account by obtaining the user’s
username and password . . . .”).  The Sublet court noted that authentication de-
pends on whether a profile was actually “created by its purported owner” and on
whether any other person has gained access to the profile. See Sublet, 113 A.3d at
712.
114. See Griffin, 19 A.3d at 422 (“[N]either we nor our appellate brethren
heretofore has considered [MARYLAND RULE 5-901’s] application to authenticate
24
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of authentication of social media was an open one that requires further
analysis.115  The court next turned to Vayner for guidance.116  In Vayner,
the Second Circuit found that social media authentication depends on a
context-specific analysis of whether, based on distinctive characteristics
and the surrounding circumstances, sufficient proof existed such that a
reasonable juror could find the item in question to be authentic.117  The
Sublet court drew from the Vayner ruling, emphasizing the distinctive char-
acteristics—or lack thereof—in the social media evidence in each of the
cases before it.118
B. Dissent Tags Majority’s Holding as a #Fail
While all seven judges joined in the majority opinion with respect to
Harris and Monge–Martinez, three of the judges dissented from the majority
in Sublet, finding the majority’s application of the reasonable juror stan-
dard in the Sublet case to be inconsistent with the court’s analysis in the
pages printed from a social networking site.”).  For a description of the facts and
holding in Griffin, see supra notes 33–38 and accompanying text.
Although the Griffin court found the information in its case to be insufficient
for authenticating the social media evidence, the court identified three potential,
non-exclusive means of social media authentication. See id. at 427–28 (listing possi-
ble methods for authenticating social media evidence).  For a list of the Griffin
court’s means for authentication, see supra note 38.
115. See Sublet, 113 A.3d at 713 (noting increase in use of social media in liti-
gation since Griffin).  The Sublet court tasked itself to “discern a standard for au-
thentication of social networking evidence” in the wake of Griffin. See id. at 714.
116. See id. (“[W]e find succor in the standard articulated by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in United States v. Vayner, which, on facts
analogous to those in Griffin, reached a similar conclusion.” (citation omitted)).
The Sublet court subsequently used the Vayner ruling as a guide in its development
of an updated standard for social media authentication. See id.
117. See id. at 715 (“[T]his requirement is satisfied if sufficient proof has been
introduced so that a reasonable juror could find in favor of authenticity or identifi-
cation.  Thereafter, the jury ultimately is left to make the determination as to
whether the evidence is, in fact, what its proponent claims.” (citation omitted)
(quoting United States v. Vayner, 769 F.3d 125, 129–30 (2d Cir. 2014)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
In Vayner, the Second Circuit found that the government failed to properly
authenticate evidence from VK.com, described as the Russian equivalent of
Facebook. See Vayner, 769 F.3d at 127 (announcing court’s holding).  The court
declined to speculate as to what evidence would have been sufficient for authenti-
cation in this case, emphasizing that the authentication of social media is highly
context-specific and can draw from a variety of sources. See id. at 133 (“We express
no view on what kind of evidence would have been sufficient to authenticate the VK
page . . . . [A]s with any piece of evidence whose authenticity is in question, the
‘type and quantum’ of evidence necessary to authenticate a web page will always
depend on context.”).  For more discussion on Vayner, see supra notes 51–53 and
accompanying text.
118. See Sublet, 113 A.3d at 718–22 (detailing distinctive characteristics pro-
vided for authentication in each of the cases at issue). See supra notes 70–105 and
accompanying text for details regarding circumstantial evidence used to authenti-
cate posts in each case.
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other cases.119  The dissenting judges felt that the majority’s decision with
respect to Sublet created bad precedent, arguing that the appellant, Sublet,
did present sufficient evidence to meet the relatively low threshold re-
quirement suggested by both the court’s holding in Harris and by the Sec-
ond Circuit in Vayner.120  Stressing the likelihood that social media’s use in
litigation will continue to become more prevalent in the future, the dis-
sent predicted that the Sublet holding would create a vague standard that
courts would struggle to apply with consistency in the future.121
119. See Sublet, 113 A.3d at 724 (Adkins, J., dissenting in part) (arguing rea-
sonable juror would have found Parker authored the last page of social media
evidence).  The dissent noted that, although Parker eventually denied having au-
thored the final page of the four pages allegedly taken from her Facebook profile,
she initially admitted to having “said” the content written in the posts, “without
qualifying” that her response referred only to “the first three pages” of the docu-
ment. See id. at 723 (identifying contradictory evidence to suggest social media
profile was properly authenticated).  Further, the dissent argued sufficient distinc-
tive characteristics existed in Sublet such that a reasonable juror could have found
Parker authored the posts on the fourth page of the document. See id. at 723–24
(“I submit that the circumstantial evidence in Sublet . . . was [ ] sufficient to pass
the preliminary, low threshold test necessary to authenticate the Facebook conver-
sation.”).  The dissent found that the similarity in content between the pages nec-
essarily led to the conclusion that the final page had also been authored by Parker
and that it would be only an unusual juror who would reach the opposite conclu-
sion. See id. at 724 (“The Majority misses the mark by ignoring that the contents
and substance of the entries on page four relate directly to the entries on pages
one through three. . . .  If we step back and put ourselves in the jury box, can we
say that we would be unreasonable if we concluded that not only did Ms. Parker
author the posts under her profile that appear on page one, but that she contin-
ued the conversation as shown on page four of the print-out?”).
120. See id. at 723–25 (noting apparent inconsistencies in majority’s ruling).
The dissent referenced the Vayner standard, noting that “the bar for authentication
of evidence is not particularly high.” Id. at 723 (quoting Vayner, 769 F.3d at 130)
(internal quotations omitted).  Comparing the circumstantial evidence in Sublet to
that in Harris, the dissent argued that the circumstantial evidence in Sublet was
sufficient to overcome the low threshold. See id. at 723 (arguing circumstantial
evidence in Sublet should suffice for authentication).  The dissent also referenced
Parker v. State, 85 A.3d 682 (Del. 2014), in which the Delaware Supreme Court
found that circumstantial evidence presented to authenticate Facebook posts was
sufficient because the substance of the post referenced the altercation at issue, the
post was created the day after the altercation at issue, and a witness “testified that
she viewed Parker’s post through a mutual friend. . . . [and subsequently] . . .
shared the post and published it on her own Facebook page.” See Sublet, 113 A.3d
at 724–25 (quoting Parker, 85 A.3d at 688) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Delaware court held that the circumstantial evidence and testimony were suffi-
cient for the trial court to find that a “reasonable juror could determine that the
proffered evidence was authentic.” See Parker, 85 A.3d at 688.  The Sublet dissent
felt that the majority ignored Parker in holding that the posts in Sublet had not
properly been authenticated, stating that more evidence had been presented in
Sublet for authentication than in Parker. See Sublet, 113 A.3d at 725 (Adkins, J.,
dissenting in part) (“The evidence supporting authentication of the Facebook en-
tries in [Sublet] is stronger than in Parker.”).
121. See Sublet, 113 A.3d at 725 (arguing majority’s holding set bad precedent
in allowing high bar for authentication).  The dissent agreed with the court’s adop-
tion of the reasonable juror standard and the use of circumstantial evidence for
social media authentication; however, the dissent felt that the standard was blurred
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V. SUBLET COURT’S DECISION UNLIKELY TO GET FOLLOWERS
Courts in the future will likely struggle to apply the rule set forth in
Sublet.122  While the court’s use of a context-specific, reasonable juror stan-
dard creates an effective baseline for social media authentication, the
court failed to provide effective guidance regarding the types and quantity
of circumstantial evidence that is sufficient for authentication.123  Courts
faced with issues of social media authentication in the future should con-
tinue to rely on the existing rules of evidence, just as the Sublet court
did.124  As technology continues to develop and more social media au-
thentication issues appear in courts, a clearer articulation of the appropri-
ate circumstantial evidence that would authenticate social media evidence
is needed to prevent the types of contrasting holdings illustrated in
Sublet.125
by the court’s holding in Sublet, stating that, if the court wants its standard to be
used effectively in future litigation, it should have developed a clearer standard.
See id. (“We would enunciate a clearer standard and advance the law more profita-
bly if we affirmed the trial court rulings in Harris and Monge–Martinez, but reversed
the trial court in Sublet.”).
122. See id. at 698 (majority opinion) (articulating reasonable juror standard
for social media authentication).  In Sublet, the court’s holdings relied on circum-
stantial evidence to determine authenticity of evidence. See id. at 718–22.  How-
ever, the application of the standard to the Sublet case appears internally
inconsistent, as the standard for authentication required in Sublet exceeded that
which was required in both Harris and Monge–Martinez. See id. at 723 (Adkins, J.,
dissenting in part) (discussing low threshold for authentication relied on for Harris
and Monge–Martinez and arguing Sublet evidence was properly authenticated based
on this standard).
123. See id. at 718–22 (drawing on evidence of content, style of messages, ex-
ternal circumstances, and other factors in ruling on authentication).  Here, by us-
ing a reasonable juror standard, which is consistent with both MARYLAND RULE 5-
901 and FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 901, the court recognizes that social media
evidence presents a vast array of authentication concerns. See id. at 712 (“Authenti-
cation of social networking communications and postings has been and continues
to be a significant issue.”).  However, as noted in the dissent, the standard applied
in Sublet appears to differ from that applied in both Harris and Monge–Martinez. See
id. at 723 (Adkins, J., dissenting in part) (“I . . . think the Majority fails, in its
disposition of the Sublet case, to adhere to the relatively low threshold for admissi-
bility that it adopts and applies to authentication issues in Harris.”).
124. See Parker, 85 A.3d at 687 (“Although we are mindful of the concern that
social media evidence could be falsified, the existing Rules of Evidence provide an
appropriate framework for determining admissibility.”).  The Parker court noted
that the ultimate determination of authenticity should be for the jury and that
therefore the trial judge’s role should be to determine whether there is enough
evidence to support a finding by a reasonable juror that the evidence is what the
proponent claims it to be. See id. at 687–88 (noting social media evidence “should
be subject to the same authentication requirements under the DELAWARE RULES OF
EVIDENCE RULE 901(b) as any other evidence” and may be authenticated with any
available form of verification, “including witness testimony, corroborative circum-
stances, distinctive characteristics, or descriptions and explanations of the techni-
cal process or system that generated the evidence in question”).
125. See Jonathan L. Moore, Time for an Upgrade: Amending the Federal Rules of
Evidence to Address the Challenges of Electronically Stored Information in Civil Litigation,
50 JURIMETRICS J. 147, 161–62 (2010) (noting courts vary in type and amount of
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A. Social Media Authentication Should Reject Friend Request
from New Rule of Evidence
While some scholars argue that social media evidence requires a spe-
cial evidentiary rule because of its unique characteristics, development of
such a rule would be both “unnecessary” and unduly confusing.126  Any
special rule that involves a trial judge acting as a gatekeeper for evidence
would likely utilize a reasonableness standard, particularly when address-
ing the authentication of evidence.127  Moreover, because every social me-
circumstantial evidence required for authentication).  Moore notes that some
courts allow electronically stored information to be authenticated with informa-
tion on printed out sheets alone, while others “remain wary of the potential for
fraud and therefore require parties to present elaborate evidence demonstrating
the integrity of a computerized storage system.” See id. at 162.
126. See Democko, supra note 7, at 370, 402 (noting heightened standard of
authentication for social media would take away jury’s ability to determine strength
of evidence for itself); see also Griffin v. State, 19 A.3d 415, 429–30 (Md. 2011)
(Harrell, J., dissenting) (emphasizing need to apply reasonable juror standard to
authentication and allow jurors to decide for themselves whether evidence is prop-
erly authenticated).
Democko further notes that authentication of evidence should be determined
on a case-by-case basis and that a bright-line rule specifically addressing social me-
dia would be insufficient. See id. at 404 (“Since technology is always changing and
the facts or circumstances surrounding each case can differ significantly, a per se
authentication rule would be inadequate to address all forms of electronic evi-
dence offered.”).  In Vayner, the Second Circuit noted that social media evidence
must be based on the particular circumstances of the case, refusing to speculate as
to what evidence would have been sufficient in that case for authentication. See
United States v. Vayner, 769 F.3d 125, 133 (2d Cir. 2014) (advocating for individu-
alized authentication of social media evidence).  The Second Circuit’s ruling sug-
gests any rule that states with greater specificity the requirements for social media
authentication would be an unhelpful and inappropriate standard. See id. (“We
express no view on what kind of evidence would have been sufficient to authenti-
cate the [Russian Facebook] page and warrant its consideration by the jury.  Evi-
dence may be authenticated in many ways, and as with any piece of evidence whose
authenticity is in question, the ‘type and quantum’ of evidence necessary to au-
thenticate a web page will always depend on context.”). But see Moore, supra note
125, at 183 (suggesting “technology-specific amendment” to Rules of Evidence
would promote consistency in authentication).
127. See, e.g., Parker v. State, 85 A.3d 682, 687–88 (Del. 2014) (adopting
Tienda reasonable juror standard for social media authentication); Tienda v. State,
358 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (utilizing reasonable juror standard
for authentication).
The court in Parker debated the merits of each of the prior standards and
found that the Tienda standard better aligned with the existing rules of evidence.
See Parker, 85 A.3d at 687–88.  In so finding, the court addressed some of the
unique issues associated with social media evidence, including the ease at which a
profile or post could be falsified and held that the use of a reasonable juror stan-
dard best dealt with these issues. See id. at 687–88 (“Although we are mindful of
the concern that social media evidence could be falsified, the existing Rules of
Evidence provide an appropriate framework for determining admissibility.”).  The
court in Sublet relied in part on the Parker decision in holding that a reasonable
juror standard was the most appropriate means of authenticating social media evi-
dence. See Sublet, 113 A.3d at 718.  These holdings indicate that courts choose to
follow a reasonableness standard in authenticating social media posts rather than
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dia post is unique and could involve a potentially infinite number of
possible circumstances, an evidentiary rule requiring courts to create a
bright line for the particular circumstances relevant to authentication
would inevitably lead to arbitrary inclusion or exclusion of evidence.128
Therefore, using the existing state and federal rules of evidence is an ap-
propriate framework from which to approach these issues.129
B. Too Many Tweets Leads to Courtroom Defeat: Courts Must Determine Level
of Circumstantial Evidence Sufficient for Authentication
The ultimate issue in Sublet v. State involved the point at which suffi-
cient circumstantial evidence exists to authenticate the social media evi-
dence.130  Because incontrovertible proof of authenticity rarely exists for
seeking to develop a new special rule for this evidence. See Democko, supra note 7,
at 400 (emphasizing sufficient flexibility of existing rules of evidence to accommo-
date changes in technology).
128. See Vayner, 769 F.3d at 133 (noting social media authentication must be
based on context).  The Vayner decision emphasizes that a bright-line rule for so-
cial media authentication would be unworkable because each item of social media
evidence is, by its nature, unique, and therefore, “the ‘type and quantum’ of evi-
dence necessary to authenticate a web page will always depend on context.” See id.
(quoting United States v. Sliker, 751 F.2d 477, 488 (2d Cir. 1984)).  Because of the
rapidly developing nature of social media, a bright-line rule would be inappropri-
ate, as social media authentication requires individual analysis based on distinct
features and relevant surrounding circumstances. See Tienda, 358 S.W.3d at 639
(“[T]he best or most appropriate method for authenticating electronic evidence
will often depend upon the nature of the evidence and the circumstances of the
particular case.”); Democko, supra note 7, at 404 (noting authentication rule for
social media “would be inadequate to address all forms of electronic evidence
offered”).
129. See Sublet, 113 A.3d at 722 (“[I]n order to authenticate evidence derived
from a social networking website, the trial judge must determine that there is
proof from which a reasonable juror could find that the evidence is what the pro-
ponent claims it to be.”).  The Sublet court’s holding is consistent with other juris-
dictions that draw from existing rules of evidence to adopt a reasonable juror
standard for social media authentication. See, e.g., Campbell v. State, 382 S.W.3d
545, 552 (Tex. Ct. App. 2012) (noting authentication succeeds without definitive
proof so long as sufficient evidence is presented to satisfy reasonable juror stan-
dard); see also State v. Eleck, 23 A.3d 818, 823 (Conn. App. Ct.) (holding that social
media evidence should be authenticated using traditional rules of evidence, in-
cluding circumstantial evidence identifying author of social media content), cert.
granted mem. in part by 30 A.3d 2 (Conn. 2011), and aff’d on other grounds by 100 A.3d
817 (Conn. 2014); Tienda, 358 S.W.3d at 638 (“The preliminary question for the
trial court to decide is simply whether the proponent of the evidence has supplied
facts that are sufficient to support a reasonable jury determination that the evi-
dence he has proffered is authentic.”).
130. See Sublet, 113 A.3d at 718–22 (affirming trial courts’ decisions to admit
or deny social media evidence based on level of circumstantial evidence presented
by proffering party for authentication).  The nature of social media evidence im-
plies that there can be no clear tipping point at which a party has presented
enough evidence to authenticate a particular post or message. See Vayner, 769 F.3d
at 130 (noting authentication of social media evidence depends on context).  The
highest standard of authentication for social media evidence is testimony by the
author confirming that they created the posts in question. See Griffin, 19 A.3d at
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social media evidence, parties must rely on various types of circumstantial
evidence for authentication.131  One common source of circumstantial ev-
idence parties have utilized in these types of cases is the content of the
profile from which the posts or messages at issue originated.132  Nonethe-
less, the nature of social media and ease with which a profile can both be
created and accessed render this evidence, standing alone, insufficient for
authentication.133
427 (“The first, and perhaps most obvious method [of authentication] would be to
ask the purported creator if she indeed created the profile and also if she added
the posting in question . . . .”).  However, in the majority of cases dealing with
authentication objections, the alleged author of a post disputes a claim of author-
ship. See, e.g., Vayner, 769 F.3d at 128 (requiring circumstantial evidence be
presented to overcome defendant’s claim that he had not created profile at issue).
Therefore, parties must rely on circumstantial evidence and distinctive characteris-
tics in order to authenticate social media posts. See Sublet, 113 A.3d at 719–22 (rely-
ing on testimony, time stamps of messages, and other circumstantial evidence to
prove authenticity of social media evidence).
131. See, e.g., Moore v. State, 763 S.E.2d 670, 674 (Ga. 2014) (allowing authen-
tication based on content of profile, structure of posts, defendant’s admission of
ownership of profile); Burgess v. State, 742 S.E.2d 464, 467 (Ga. 2013) (holding
circumstantial evidence based on content of profile and testimony about defen-
dant corresponding to profile information sufficient for authentication); Com-
monwealth v. Foster F., 20 N.E.3d 967, 971 (Mass. App. Ct. 2014) (finding
defendant’s actions relating to content of messages, affidavit from Facebook re-
cord keeper, and police report regarding messages provided sufficient circumstan-
tial evidence for authentication).  For detailed analyses of Foster F., Burgess, and
Moore, see supra notes 59 and 60.
132. See, e.g., Moore, 763 S.E.2d at 674 (authenticating Facebook profile in part
based on private details about defendant posted on page); Burgess, 742 S.E.2d at
467 (allowing authentication of MySpace profile based on nickname on profile,
photographs, and personal information about defendant on page). But see Smith
v. State, 136 So. 3d 424, 434–35 (Miss. 2014) (holding name and profile picture
alone insufficient to authenticate profile).  In both Moore and Burgess, the Georgia
Supreme Court found that the use of circumstantial evidence from the defen-
dant’s social media profile met the reasonable juror standard for authentication.
See Moore, 763 S.E.2d at 674 (“Based on this direct and circumstantial evidence, we
find that the Facebook page was properly authenticated.”); Burgess, 742 S.E.2d at
467 (“In this case, there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to authenticate the
printout from the MySpace profile page.”).  However, in Smith, the only evidence
offered for authentication was the name on a Facebook profile and an unclear
profile picture; the court held that additional circumstantial evidence must be pro-
duced to authenticate the Facebook account as belonging to the defendant. See
Smith, 136 So. 3d at 434 (finding “State failed [to] make a prima facie case that the
Facebook profile whence the messages came belonged to Smith . . . . [or] that the
messages were actually sent by Smith”).
133. See Campbell, 382 S.W.3d at 550 (finding evidence of account from which
message sent insufficient for authentication).  The ease with which any person can
create a profile on a social media site renders it impossible to determine, based
solely on the information on a page, who actually controls that profile. See Tienda,
358 S.W.3d at 641–42 (noting ease at which profiles can be hacked or accessed by
parties other than account owner).  Similarly, testimony by a party who received
messages from an account or who saw posts on a particular page cannot authenti-
cate those messages. See Eleck, 23 A.3d at 820–21 (holding testimony by recipient
of Facebook messages insufficient standing alone for authentication).  Even if the
recipient of a message testifies that it came from the alleged party’s profile, with-
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Testimony by an alleged author that they did not create a disputed
post raises significant doubt regarding authenticity.134  If such testimony is
presented, the other party must counter this claim with additional circum-
stantial evidence.135  If authorship of a particular post or message is dis-
puted, the trial judge must balance whether the proffering party
presented sufficient circumstantial evidence to overcome the alleged au-
thor’s denial of authorship.136  The Sublet court provided little guidance
out additional evidence, this testimony is insufficient to authenticate the message.
See id. at 822 (“[P]roving only that a message came from a particular account,
without further authenticating evidence, has been held to be inadequate proof of
authorship.”).  The Sublet court, in affirming the authentication of the Facebook
messages sent in Monge–Martinez, relied heavily on testimony by Santa Maria, who
claimed that she had received the messages in question and that they were sent by
Monge–Martinez. See Sublet, 113 A.3d at 721.  However, this authentication was
based on a compilation of Santa Maria’s testimony and other circumstantial evi-
dence, including the style and language of the messages and the reference to
events known only by a small number of people. See id. at 722 (“[I]n the case sub
judice there is far more circumstantial evidence of Monge–Martinez’s authorship
than a bare assertion that he was the author.”).
134. See Sublet, 113 A.3d at 718–19 (finding Sublet failed to overcome Parker’s
testimony denying authorship of posts at issue).  In Sublet, the court gave great
weight to Parker’s denial of authorship of the disputed Facebook posts. See id.
(noting denial of authorship “necessarily undercuts the notion of authenticity”).
The court, in balancing the circumstantial evidence presented by Sublet against
Parker’s testimony, determined that Sublet did not present sufficient evidence to
overcome Parker’s testimony and thus was not properly authenticated. See id. at
719 (“No showing was made from which a reasonable juror could have found the
pages to be authentic . . . .”).
135. See Campbell, 382 S.W.3d at 551–52 (finding state presented sufficient evi-
dence overcoming defendant’s denial of authorship).  In Campbell, the court began
by noting that the defendant denied having sent the messages at issue, and then
examined the additional circumstantial evidence to determine whether sufficient
confirming circumstances existed to overcome defendant’s claim. See id. (finding
unique speech pattern and reference to incident and potential charges sufficient
to overcome denial of authorship).  When a dispute exists regarding authorship,
the trial judge’s responsibility is not to definitively rule on authorship, but to deter-
mine whether sufficient evidence is presented to tip the balance such that “the jury
[is] entitled to weigh the credibility of [the] witnesses and decide who was telling
the truth.” See id. at 551; see also Tienda, 358 S.W.3d at 645–46 (holding proffered
evidence sufficient to go to jury).  In Tienda, the court recognized that it was
“within the realm of possibility that the appellant was the victim of some elaborate
and ongoing conspiracy,” but noted that this “is an alternate scenario whose likeli-
hood and weight the jury was entitled to assess . . . .” See id. at 645–46.
136. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Williams, 926 N.E.2d 1162, 1172 (Mass. 2010)
(finding testimony by recipient, username, and profile picture insufficient to over-
come party’s denial of authorship; also noting need for more information regard-
ing security of MySpace profile and ease at which third party could access
account); Campbell, 382 S.W.3d at 551–52 (finding totality of circumstantial evi-
dence sufficient to support rational jury finding that messages were authored by
defendant).  Additionally, according to one commentator, “[t]he current standard
for authentication is low,” and therefore the party proffering the contested evi-
dence must only demonstrate sufficient proof such that a reasonable juror could
find the evidence to be authentic. See Democko, supra note 7, at 401 (“A party
seeking to admit evidence only needs to make a prima facie showing that it is what
the party claims it to be.”).
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regarding the level of evidence sufficient for authentication in these situa-
tions, so courts in the future must seek to develop consistent rules regard-
ing the necessary circumstantial evidence that will help lawyers and judges
navigate the currently unsettled field.137
VI. SUBLET WRITES ON THE WALL FOR FUTURE COURT DECISIONS
Since the Maryland Court of Appeals decided Sublet, a number of
other courts have decided cases in which a party attempted to introduce
social media evidence.138  Each of these courts explicitly or implicitly uti-
lized a reasonable juror standard, yet varied in the type and amount of
circumstantial evidence required for authentication.139  This indicates a
need for greater education and consistency surrounding social media and
its use in litigation.140  In particular, trial judges must have at least a basic
understanding of major social media sites, including knowledge of how
profiles are created and accessed, as well as how information is shared
through the site, so that appropriate circumstantial evidence is admitted
to authenticate social media evidence.141
137. See Sublet, 113 A.3d at 725 (Adkins, J., dissenting in part) (“[T]he Major-
ity set bad precedent in holding that a trial judge can establish such a high bar for
authentication as the court did in the Sublet case.”).  The dissent further criticized
the majority’s finding that the Facebook posts were not authenticated in Sublet,
claiming “[t]he Majority muddled [the] ‘reasonable juror’ standard” and created
precedent that will not clearly advance the law. See id.
138. See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 30 N.E.3d 1264, 1269 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (hold-
ing username, pictures, content of Twitter profile sufficient to authenticate page);
Boyd v. State, 175 So. 3d 1, 5–6 (Miss. 2015) (finding Facebook messages properly
authenticated based on cell phone number sent in one message).  In each of these
cases, it can be inferred that the courts relied on the reasonable juror standard as a
basis for authentication. See Wilson, 30 N.E.3d at 1268–69 (“[T]aken together, the
witness testimony identifying the Twitter account as belonging to Wilson and the
content posted on the account, including pictures and gang references, are more
than sufficient to authenticate the Twitter posts as being authored by Wilson.”);
Boyd, 175 So. 3d at 6 (“[T]he Facebook messages were properly admitted consider-
ing the circumstances laid out here.”).
139. See supra note 138 for evidence that Boyd and Wilson courts implicitly
used reasonable juror standard.
140. See Fred Galves, Where the Not-So-Wild Things Are: Computers in the Court-
room, the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the Need for Institutional Reform and More Judicial
Acceptance, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 161, 275 (2000) (footnote in title omitted) (argu-
ing for “formal and comprehensive educational program” for judges and court
officials regarding new technologies).  The rapid development of social media sug-
gests that any rule presently developed “may be irrelevant in five years.” See
Democko, supra note 7, at 400, 405 (arguing education of judges and attorneys will
support courts’ efforts to keep up with the rapid development of social media and
court participants in a better position to address social media authentication).
141. See Democko, supra note 7, at 405 (“Therefore, education, rather than a
formal amendment, is the appropriate remedy and will ultimately prove more ef-
fective [to solve the issues surrounding social media authentication].”).  Social me-
dia evidence presents unique issues regarding authorship; because anyone can
make a profile using another person’s information, a viewer can never be sure that
a particular profile actually belongs to the purported owner. See Campbell, 382
S.W.3d at 550 (“[B]ecause anyone can establish a fictitious profile under any
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The role of social media evidence in litigation will only continue to
grow and develop, and courts will be faced with an infinite number of
unique circumstances by which particular items of evidence may be au-
thenticated.142  Attorneys and judges must therefore continue to keep up
with changes and developments in social media and be aware of the possi-
ble authentication issues that may arise.143  Courts attempting to apply the
reasoning of Sublet to future cases must recognize that, while the reasona-
ble juror standard provides a proper baseline for social media authentica-
tion, the authenticity of each item of evidence must be based on its own
unique facts and circumstances.144
Just as many courts have used the rules of evidence to determine au-
thenticity of social media accounts, courts should consider applying either
the state or federal version of Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
which suggest that courts should apply a balancing test to determine
whether the probative value of the evidence sufficiently outweighs the con-
cerns regarding authorship.145  Absent affirmative testimony by a post’s
name, the person viewing the profile has no way of knowing whether the profile is
legitimate.”).  Further, anyone can access another person’s profile by gaining his
or her username and password or, in many cases, merely by accessing the profile
through the individual’s cell phone or personal computer, which already has the
password and username cached. See id. (“[B]ecause a person may gain access to
another person’s account by obtaining the user’s name and password, the person
viewing communications on or from an account profile cannot be certain that the
author is in fact the profile owner.”); see also State v. Eleck, 23 A.3d 818, 822
(Conn. App. Ct.) (noting social media users often store passwords on personal
computers and cell phones, and allowing access even without entering password),
cert. granted mem. in part by 30 A.3d 2 (Conn. 2011), and aff’d on other grounds by 100
A.3d 817 (Conn. 2014).
142. See Schoen, supra note 10 (“With increasing frequency, social media post-
ings, including words, pictures, and other images, are becoming sources of evi-
dence in a variety of cases.”).  In Sublet, the dissent stressed the likely increase of
social media use in litigation. See Sublet, 113 A.3d at 725 (Adkins, J., dissenting in
part) (“Use of social media as evidence in civil and criminal trials is likely to be-
come increasingly important.”).  With over one billion people using social media
worldwide, the potential issues that may arise in litigation are infinite. See Delaney
& Heitner, supra note 2, at 11 (discussing statistics regarding number of Facebook
users worldwide).
143. See Democko, supra note 7, at 405 (emphasizing need for further educa-
tion in light of increased prevalence of social media in litigation).
144. See Sublet, 113 A.3d at 697–98 (applying reasonable juror standard to au-
thentication).  Because every case involving social media is unique, analysis of so-
cial media evidence must be context-specific and rely on relevant circumstantial
evidence supporting authenticity. See id. at 715 (“[T]he preliminary determination
of authentication must be made by the trial judge and ‘depends upon a context-
specific determination whether the proof advanced is sufficient to support a find-
ing that the item in question is what its proponent claims it to be’ . . . .” (quoting
United States v. Vayner, 769 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2014))).
145. See FED. R. EVID. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the fol-
lowing: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury . . . .”).  Absent
testimony by the post’s creator, courts will have to rely on circumstantial evidence
in determining whether a reasonable juror could find the post to be authentic.
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creator, courts will always have to rely on some level of circumstantial evi-
dence to determine the authenticity of a particular post.146  A trial judge,
in ruling on whether there is enough evidence for a jury to find that the
alleged author actually wrote the post in question, should balance the
value of the evidence against the strength of the circumstantial evidence
to determine whether a reasonable juror could find the post to be authen-
tic.147  However courts decide to draw the line for authentication of social
media evidence, one thing is obvious: a clearer standard is necessary.148
See, e.g., Tienda v. State, 358 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (“Evidence
may be authenticated in a number of ways, including by . . . circumstantial
evidence.”).
146. See Burgess v. State, 742 S.E.2d 464, 467 (Ga. 2013) (permitting use of
circumstantial evidence to authenticate MySpace posts).  In Burgess, because the
authorship of the particular posts was in question, the court relied on witness testi-
mony and other evidence supporting the authentication of the MySpace profile.
See id.
147. See Campbell v. State, 382 S.W.3d 545, 552 (Tex. Ct. App. 2012) (“[J]ury
was entitled to weigh the credibility of these witnesses and decide who was telling
the truth.”).  In Campbell, the court found that the state presented sufficient cir-
cumstantial evidence to surpass the necessary threshold showing to allow for a jury
to make an ultimate determination regarding authentication. See id. at 553 (“[W]e
conclude that there was prima facie evidence such that a reasonable jury could
have found that the Facebook messages were created by Campbell.”).  The court
noted that, while more than one scenario existed to explain the authorship of the
particular messages, the proffered evidence was “within the zone of reasonable
disagreement,” such that it could be presented to the jury. See id. at 552 (quoting
Tienda, 358 S.W.3d at 638) (internal quotation marks omitted).
148. See Sublet, 113 A.3d at 725 (Adkins, J., dissenting in part) (“The Majority
muddled our ‘reasonable juror’ standard . . . .”); see also Vayner, 769 F.3d at 133
(noting social media authentication “will always depend on context”).  While tech-
nological advances have led to questions of whether the Rules of Evidence should
be amended, the existing rules “that have for many years governed the admissibil-
ity of evidence are more than adequate to the task.” See Goode, supra note 10, at
63 (recognizing concerns regarding manipulation of electronic evidence and not-
ing existing rules adequately address concerns).  Indeed, because social media evi-
dence is particularly susceptible to manipulation, courts must be especially aware
of these susceptibilities and better articulate procedures for the amount and type
of circumstantial evidence needed for authentication. See, e.g., Parker v. State, 85
A.3d 682, 688 (Del. 2014) (finding circumstantial evidence adequate for authenti-
cation); Tienda, 358 S.W.3d at 647 (comparing circumstantial evidence to that
presented in Griffin v. State, 19 A.3d 415 (Md. 2011) and finding greater “circum-
stantial indicia of authenticity” supporting prima facie authentication).  In Tienda,
the court compared the available evidence to that presented in Griffin and at-
tempted to develop some consistency in the type and amount of circumstantial
evidence needed for authentication. See id.
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